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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in denying Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for

summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law that Plaintiffs cannot meet their
burden to prove that Advanced Shoring breached its contract or warranty or that
Advanced Shoring's breach caused Plaintiffs' damages without expert testimony, in a
case involving complex allegations of improper geotechnical analysis and underpinning
of residential construction, where Plaintiffs did not designate and would not present
expert testimony at trial?
Standard of review: Review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions, and viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Normandeau v.
Hansen Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, f9, 215 P.3d 152; Prince Yeates and Geldzahler v.
Young, 2004 UT 26, ^10, 94 P.3d 179.
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the parties' briefing and oral argument
regarding Advanced Shoring's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 39 at pp. 4-9.)
2.

Did the trial court err in denying motion for directed verdict made by

Advanced Shoring at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief on the basis that Plaintiffs failed
to meet their burden to prove that Advanced Shoring caused Plaintiffs' damages without
expert testimony, in a case involving complex allegations of improper geotechnical
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1

analysis and underpinning of residential construction, where Plaintiffs did not present
expert testimony at trial?
Standard of review: "When reviewing the denial of a motion for involuntary
dismissal, an appellate court should defer to the trial court's findings and inferences under
a clearly erroneous standard and review the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness." Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ^173 P.3d 865; Southern Title
Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
Preservation: This issue was preserved in oral argument on Advanced Shoring's
motion for directed verdict at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief. (R. 79 at pp. 114-116.)
3.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying Advanced Shoring's

pretrial motion for summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law because
Plaintiffs cannot recover direct or consequential damages for loss in value of their
residence because they surrendered the residence in bankruptcy prior to trial and
therefore did not own any interest in the property damaged?
Standard of review: Review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions, and viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Normandeauv.
Hansen Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, TJ9, 215 P.3d 152; Prince Yeates and Geldzahler v.
Young, 2004 UT 26, ^[10, 94 P.3d 179.
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the parties' briefing and oral argument
regarding Advanced Shoring's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 39 at pp. 1-4.)

2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4.

Did the trial court err in denying Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for

summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law on the basis that an enforceable
warranty cannot be created by a single statement made by Advanced Shoring that "I
won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000.00 more", but that rather such a statement is too
indefinite to form an enforceable contract?
Standard of review: Review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions, and viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Prince Yeates and
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179; Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d
357 (Utah App. 1998).
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the parties5 briefing and oral argument
regarding Advanced Shoring's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of case and course of proceedings below

This is a construction defect action filed by Plaintiffs as a result of foundation
settling at the residence they formerly owned in LaVerkin, Utah. (R. 27 at pp. 1-2.)
Plaintiffs filed this case on or about June 13, 2008, seeking recovery from Advanced
Shoring for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel, breach of
warranty, and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. (R. 1.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After conducting discovery, Advanced Shoring first moved for summary judgment
on or about November 30, 2009. (R. 21.) Advanced Shoring's motion was based (in
part) on the fact on Plaintiffs' testimony that the sole basis for their breach of warranty
claim is the statement "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more", which Plaintiffs
allege was made by an employee of Advanced Shoring. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.) Advanced
Shoring argued that this statement, standing alone, was much too indefinite to form the
basis for an enforceable contract or warranty. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.) In a brief order issued
on May 11, 2010, the trial court indicated that "[a]s the Court finds that certain areas of
material fact, particularly those relating to the alleged "warranty," remain in dispute,
summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture." (R. 33.)
After the expiration of expert discovery deadlines, Advanced Shoring filed a
second motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs failed to designate
an expert to testify on their behalf Plaintiffs could not meet their required burden of proof
with respect to causation. (R. 39 at pp. 4-9.) Advanced Shoring also argued that
Plaintiffs could not recover because they lost the Property as a result of their voluntary
failure to make mortgage payments. (R. 39 at pp. 1-4.) Despite the agreement of the
parties on the central facts applicable to these issues, the trial court again denied
summary judgment on both arguments because of the existence of unspecified material
disputes of fact. (See docket.)
This case was tried to the bench from January 24 - 28, 2011. (R. 62, 67.)
Advanced Shoring raised the issues that form the basis of the instant appeal both in
renewed dispositive motions and in closing argument. (R. 79 at pp. 114-140, 80 at 604 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

89.) Specifically, at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, Advanced Shoring made a
motion for a directed verdict based on Plaintiffs' failure to present expert testimony
required to prove that any act or omission by Advanced Shoring caused Plaintiffs'
damages. (R. 79 at pp. 114-116.) Advanced Shoring's motion was denied. (R. 79 at p.
140.) At the conclusion of trial the Court found for Plaintiffs on the breach of warranty
and breach of contract causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' other causes of action.
(R. 80 at 89-101.) Plaintiffs have not cross-appealed the dismissal of their remaining
causes of action.
Facts
The following facts were either admitted on summary judgment or undisputed at
trial:
Plaintiffs built a house on a lot located at 355 North 560 West in La Verkin, Utah
(the "Property") in 2004. (R. 27 at pp. 1-2.) In 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a loan and
executed a promissory note. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) The promissory note was secured by
the Property through a Deed of Trust. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs began to notice
that the Property was settling two months after moving in. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.)
Plaintiffs filed suit in Fifth District Court against their general contractor and
several subcontractors who performed work on the Property. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.)
Plaintiffs brought claims seeking recovery for damage to the Property due to sinking of
the foundation. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs ultimately settled the litigation against
the general contractor who built their house. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After settling that litigation, Plaintiffs' attorney obtained a bid from Advanced
Shoring to perform certain repairs on the Property. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs
directed their attorney to execute a written contract with Advanced Shoring on their
behalf. (R. 39 at p. vi; R. 44.) Advanced Shoring began work on the Property in early
2006. (R. 39 at p. vi; R. 44.) After commencing work, Advanced Shoring learned that
the condition of the Property was such that additional work and materials were needed to
stabilize Plaintiffs' foundation.

(R. 27 at p. 5.)

Plaintiffs testified that Advanced

Shoring's representative told Plaintiffs that "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000
more." (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.) Plaintiffs authorized Advanced Shoring to perform the
additional work, and paid approximately $8,700.00. (R. 39 at p. vi; R. 44.)
Advanced Shoring performed work on the Property on more than one occasion,
providing substantial work and materials in an attempt to stabilize the foundation. (R. 27
at p. 4.) Advanced Shoring completed its work, and then was notified that the Property
continued to sink. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) Advanced Shoring returned to the Property
and performed substantial additional work in attempt to prevent the Property from
sinking further. (R. 39 at p. vii; R, 44.) Ultimately, Advanced Shoring's efforts to
prevent further sinking of the Property were unsuccessful. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.)
Beginning in June, 2009, Plaintiffs defaulted on the promissory note by failing to
make required monthly payments. (R.. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) Notice of Default and Election
to Sell the Property was filed by the holder of the deed of trust on or about August 25,
2009. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) On or about January 14, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a petition in
the United States Bankruptcy Court in and for the District of Utah seeking protection
6
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under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

(R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.)

Documents filed with the bankruptcy court indicate that Plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy
protection because they were no longer able to satisfy their obligations to numerous
creditors. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) Additionally, Plaintiffs represented to the United
States Trustee that Mr. Hone's inability to continue working after suffering a blood clot
in his leg reduced Plaintiffs income substantially. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) Plaintiffs filed
a sworn statement of financial affairs with the bankruptcy Court indicating that Plaintiffs
intended to surrender the Property to the holder of the trust deed. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.)
On or about January 15, 2010, the holder of the deed of trust moved the bankruptcy court
to lift the automatic stay to allow the holder to foreclose the deed of trust, as Plaintiffs
were in default and had no equity interest in the Property. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) The
bankruptcy court granted the motion on or about February 10, 2010. (R. 39 at p. viii; R.
44.) Creditor then initiated a non-judicial foreclosure, which was completed by issuance
of a trustee's deed on or about March 8, 2010. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) This trustee's
deed transferred title to the Property to a buyer who purchased the Property at the
trustee's sale. (R. 39 at p. viii-ix; R. 44.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant challenges the denial of two pretrial motions for summary judgments
which presented arguments based on undisputed facts, and the denial of its motion for
directed verdict made at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief. Though the trial court
denied these motions with largely cursory rulings indicating (in the case of the motions
for summary judgment) that material issues of fact existed which precluded summary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
7
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judgment, these rulings were based entirely on undisputed facts - either testimony
provided by Plaintiffs in deposition, the admitted failure of plaintiffs to retain an expert to
testify in support of their claims, or the fact and effect of Plaintiffs' bankruptcy. In every
case, the undisputed facts presented in Advanced Shoring's Motions did not materially
change at trial. Therefore, the denial of these pretrial motions is properly challenged on
appeal.
The evidence presented by Plaintiffs was insufficient, as a matter of law, to
survive summary judgment because they failed to designate an expert to testify on their
behalf as to the elements of causation and breach. Plaintiffs tried their case primarily on
the theories of breach of contract and breach of warranty, and the trial court's award was
based on the breach of warranty theory only. However, each of these causes of action
requires Plaintiffs to present evidence of breach and causation to recover. Determination
of whether Advanced Shoring breached its contract with Plaintiffs or any warranty
provided to Plaintiffs required analysis of the appropriateness of the geotechnical work
performed by Advanced Shoring and whether any deficiency in Advanced Shoring's
work caused Plaintiffs' damages. Due to the highly technical nature of Advanced
Shoring's work, and the multiplicity of potential causes for the sinking of the Property,
Plaintiffs were required to submit expert testimony in order to meet their burden. In
response, Plaintiffs firmly represented that they did not intend to present expert
testimony. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant Advanced Shoring's Motion.
At trial, Advanced Shoring again moved for dismissal on the basis that, without
expert testimony, the Plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden of proof. Plaintiffs did
8
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not present any expert testimony in support of their claims. However, the trial court
denied the motion without specifying a reason for doing so. The trial court erred in
denying Advanced Shoring's motion because the technical and complicated nature of
Advanced Shoring's work and the myriad of factors that could have caused the Property
to sink required Plaintiffs to present expert testimony in order to prove, beyond mere
speculation that Advanced Shoring caused or contributed to Plaintiffs' damages.
Advanced Shoring also sought summary judgment because Plaintiffs did not suffer
any damages as a result of Advanced Shoring's conduct. The proper measure of contract
or warranty damages is the amount necessary to "place the nonbreaching party in as good
a position as if the contract had been performed." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, \ 31,
990 P.2d 933. In June of 2009, long after Advanced Shoring ceased working on the
Property, Plaintiffs decided to stop making their mortgage payments, and predictably a
secured creditor instituted foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs then filed for bankruptcy
protection under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Advanced Shoring
indisputably had no involvement in Plaintiffs' bankruptcy or their decision to cease
making mortgage payments. The combination of surrendering the Property to secured
creditors and the bankruptcy discharge reduced Plaintiffs' interest in the Property to zero.
Given that Plaintiffs no longer own the Property, they are in the same position they would
be in regardless of any breach of warranty or breach of contract by Advanced Shoring.
Finally, the trial court erred in denying Advanced Shoring's motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiffs' warranty claim because the language identified by Plaintiffs was
insufficient to create a warranty as a matter of law. Plaintiffs repeatedly testified that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sole basis for their belief that Advanced Shoring provided them with a warranty was the
statement that "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more". Plaintiffs claimed that
Advanced Shoring made this statement in the context of requesting payment for
additional piers necessary to support the foundation of the Property. However, Advanced
Shoring's statement does not actually promise or represent anything. Rather, it merely
indicates that, if Plaintiffs would not pay for the additional work to be performed, no
warranty could be provided. In contrast with the "direct and positive affirmation of fact"
required by Utah law in order for a warranty to arise, Advanced Shoring's statement is far
too indefinite to give rise to an enforceable warranty. SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson,
Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, % 21, 28 P.3d 669. It is, at best, either
an offer to provide further construction services, or a hopelessly vague and indefinite
agreement to agree, which lacks the basic requirements for enforcement as a matter of
law.

10
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ARGUMENT
I.

ADVANCED SHORING HAS PROPERLY CHALLENGED THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PRETRIAL MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
a.
The denial of a pretrial motion for summary judgment can be
challenged on appeal where the denial was on purely legal grounds

The Utah Supreme Court has explained that any time "that reasonable minds
could not differ as to the conclusion to draw from the evidence or that the evidence
adduced was simply insufficient to sustain the legal claim, then the trial court should rule
on the issue as a matter of law." Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44,
f 15, 215 P.3d 152. The Court then held that "when a court denies a motion for summary
judgment on a purely legal basis, that is where the court denies the motion based on the
undisputed facts, rather than because of the existence of a disputed material fact, the party
denied summary judgment may challenge that denial on appeal." Id.
In this case, Advanced Shoring filed two separate motions for summary judgment.
(R. 21; R. 39 at pp. 4-9.) The trial court denied each motion with a cursory statement that
material issues of fact existed which precluded summary judgment. However, the claims
raised herein on appeal were based on undisputed facts, and involved purely legal
determinations regarding whether the evidence presented could sustain a ruling in favor
of Plaintiffs as a matter of law. These facts did not materially change at trial. Therefore,
despite the trial court's cursory contention that material issues of fact existed, it is clear
that Advanced Shoring's motions raised purely legal questions, and that Advanced

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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%

Shoring is therefore entitled to appeal the trial court's denial of its motions for summary
judgment.

<
b.
Advanced Shoring's challenge to the pretrial denial of its motions
for summary judgment is proper because the motions were based on
undisputed facts and turned on purely legal rulings

Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment in this case prior to trial on the
basis that expert testimony was required to prove Plaintiffs' claims, and Plaintiffs failed
to designate any expert witnesses to give testimony at trial. (R. 21; R. 39 at pp. 4-9.) The
facts supporting Appellant's argument, namely the nature of Plaintiffs' defect claims and
Plaintiffs' refusal to designate an expert to testify relative to said defects, were
undisputed. (R. 44.) Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that, due to Advanced Shoring's
failure to properly perform its geotechnical and underpinning work, the Property
continued to settle. (R. 44.) Moreover, the record undisputedly discloses that Plaintiffs
never designated an expert to testify on their behalf, and Plaintiffs have repeatedly
asserted that they had no intention of presenting expert testimony at trial. (R. 44.)
"Whether expert testimony is required to prove an element of the plaintiffs prima
facie case as a matter of law..." Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406,ffi[14,
21-23, 176 P.3d 446; see also Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 2009 UT App 347, ^20,
222 P.3d 775. Therefore, the trial court's decision as to whether Plaintiffs' claims
required them to present expert testimony, and thus to deny Advanced Shoring's motion
for summary judgment, was a purely legal ruling, and is appropriately challenged on
appeal.

12
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In the same motion for summary judgment, Advanced Shoring challenged
Plaintiffs' ability to recover for damage to the Property given that Plaintiffs voluntarily
surrendered the Property in bankruptcy after deciding to stop making payments on their
mortgage. (R. 39 at pp. 1-4.) Advanced Shoring's motion argued that Plaintiffs suffered
no recoverable damages because Plaintiffs' lost the Property through their own choices
and not as a result of any act or omission of Advanced Shoring. (R. 39.) Plaintiffs are in
exactly the same position as if there were no breach, and thus Plaintiffs have no damages.
The fact that Plaintiffs' voluntarily ceased making their mortgage payments and
filed bankruptcy was clearly established by Plaintiffs bankruptcy filings, and was
supported by testimony given by Plaintiffs at trial. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44; R. 78 at 108:1019.) There is no dispute that Advanced Shoring had not worked on the Property for more
than a year at the time Plaintiffs stopped making their mortgage payments. (R. 39 at p.
vii; R. 44.) These facts were undisputed, and did not materially change at trial.
"Anytime 'that reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion to draw
from the evidence or that the evidence adduced was simply insufficient to sustain the
legal claim, then the trial court should rule on the issue as a matter of law.'"
Normandeau, 2009 UT 44 at ^[15 (quoting AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of
Am., 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997)). The facts of Plaintiffs' bankruptcy are undisputed
and therefore resolution of Advanced Shoring's motion turned on a pure question of law,
namely, whether reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion to draw from the
evidence that Plaintiffs voluntarily surrendered all interest in the Property to secured
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creditors. The trial court's denial of Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion on this basis is
appropriately challenged on appeal.
Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of
Plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim because the statement on which this claim was based
was too indefinite to constitute a warranty as a matter of law. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.)
Plaintiffs' alleged that Advanced Shoring told Lana Hone that "I won't guarantee it
unless I get $10,000 more." (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.) Plaintiffs admitted that this statement is
the sole basis for their breach of warranty claim. (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.)
Advanced Shoring's motion argued that this statement could not, as a matter of
law, constitute an enforceable warranty because it is not "a direct and positive affirmation
of fact" and is so indefinite as to be unenforceable. See SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson,
Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, \ 21, 28 P.3d 669; Brown's Shoe Fit
Co. v. Olch, 955 P. 2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Resolution of Advanced Shoring's
argument that no enforceable warranty exists turned on a pure question of law because
the facts on which this claim was based were undisputed for purposes of the motion. The
trial court's denial of Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion on this basis is therefore
appropriately challenged on appeal.

14
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ADVANCED SHORING'S
PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
SUBSEQUENT MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT PROVE THEIR CLAIMS
WITHOUT EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND PLAINTIFFS NEVER
DESIGNATED AN EXPERT.
a.

Plaintiffs' claims require proof of causation and standard of care

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges five causes of action: breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, unjust
enrichment/quantum meruit, and breach of warranty. (R. 1.) Of those five causes of
action, four—breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of warranty—all require some showing
of proximate cause. Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion sought dismissal of each of the
claims based on Plaintiffs' inability to prove causation without an expert. (R. 22.)
Each of the Plaintiffs' claims required the trial court to determine the
appropriateness of Advanced Shoring's geotechnical work in evaluating and
underpinning the Property, and whether any deficiencies in that work caused Plaintiffs'
damages. Under Utah law, there appears to be no distinction between causation in the
context of contract-based versus negligence-based claims. For example, an essential
element of an action for breach of contract is a showing that the breach caused the
plaintiffs damages. Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, f 21,
83 P.3d 391. As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Thurston, "[Djamages are not
recoverable for losses suffered . . . unless the requirements of the law as to 'proximate'
causation are satisfied. The form of this rule is the same whether it is being applied in the
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field of contracts or in the field of torts." Id. at \ 23 (quoting 5 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 997 (interim ed. 1964)) (alterations in original). The same rule applies to
actions for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Crookston
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 793 (Utah 1991); Thomas Am. Stone & Bldg.y Inc. v.
White, 142 B.R. 449, 453 (D. Utah 1992). Similarly, a claim for negligent
misrepresentation requires a showing that "the misrepresentation is the legal cause" of the
damages suffered. Forsberg v. Burningham & Kimball, 892 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct. App.
1995). "Proof of proximate cause is also required in breach of warranty actions . . . ."
Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996).
As the Thurston court noted, evidence of causation is always necessary in order to
avoid summary judgment, even in breach of contract actions. Thurston, 2003 Utah App
438 at ^fll 18, 23. Thurston involved a breach of contract action brought against a home
health-care company by the family of a disabled man after he was found dead under
suspicious circumstances. Thurston, 2003 UT App 438 at % 6. The family alleged that
the man had committed suicide as a result of the company's failure to monitor his mental
health and growing dependency on drugs and alcohol. Id. This Court upheld the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the company, noting that "due to the
unusual circumstances and lack of direct evidence surrounding Thurston's death, the jury
would need some assistance in making the connection between the conduct of Defendants
and the death of Thurston." Id. at <| 18. Since the plaintiffs expert testimony was
excluded, "[s]ummary judgment was appropriate due to the lack of evidence concerning
the proximate cause of Thurston's death." Id. at \ 20. This was true even though some of
16
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the plaintiffs' claims were for breach of contract, since "Defendants' acts, whether
breaches of contract or torts, must be causally linked to Plaintiffs1 damages." Id. at f 23.
b.
Plaintiffs' claims required expert testimony in order to prove breach
and causation, and Plaintiffs did not designate any experts.
Expert testimony is often necessary to "establish the standard of care required in
cases dealing with the duties owed by a particular profession, especially where the
average person has little understanding of the duties owed by the particular profession at
issue, or the case involves complex allegations." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency,
2009 UT App 347, %L\, 222 P.3d 775 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Engineering issues of a technical nature are considered beyond the scope of common
knowledge and require expert testimony. See Warenski, 2011 UT App 197 at ^[11; cf.
Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting the
requirement of expert testimony regarding the standard of care for "cases involving
medical doctors, architects, and engineers") (quoting Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d
821, 826 n. 8 (Utah. Ct. App. 1989)) (emphasis added).
Specifically, expert testimony is required to prove causation if the issues involved
"are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a
finding

" Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, f 16, 12 P.3d 1015 (quoting

Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)); see also
Warenski v. Advanced RVSupply, 2011 UT App 197, f 11, — P.3d — . For example, in
the medical malpractice context, expert testimony is required unless causation of the
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alleged injury is "obvious to a layperson." Florez v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2010 UT
App 254,1(19, 240 P.3d 107.
As this Court recently made clear in Warenski, "when the circumstances and the
probabilities as to the causative factors of an accident lie within the ken of experts, expert
evidence is necessary to establish a foundation that gives rise to an inference of
negligence." Warenski, 2011 UT App 197 at ^10 (quoting King v. Searle Pharm., Inc.,
832 P.2d 858, 862 (Utah 1992)).
Warenski involved a claim against a repair shop for an alleged failure to properly
inspect and repair a tie rod on the plaintiffs all-terrain vehicle. Id. at Tf 2. In that case,
the Court held that expert testimony was required to show both breach and causation,
noting that "the average person would not be knowledgeable about how a tie rod is
properly installed, what dangers may result if the tie rod is not properly installed, or how
a tie rod could become disconnected." Id. at ^[11. Since no admissible expert testimony
was provided, this Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
the defendant. Id. at ^ 14; see also Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, K 22,
176 P.3d 446 ("It is only in 'the most obvious cases' that a plaintiff may be excepted
from the requirement of using expert testimony to prove causation.") (quoting Beard,
2000 UT App 285 at ^16).
Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that their damages were caused by Advanced
Shoring5s acts or omissions. And like the plaintiffs in Thurston, Plaintiffs were required
to produce expert testimony in order to establish that Advanced Shoring's conduct, rather
than any of the many other possible causes, caused their home to sink—which,
18
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incidentally, it was already doing well before Advanced Shoring ever arrived on the site.
(R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) However, Plaintiffs did not present any expert testimony in response
to Advanced Shoring's motion.
Plaintiffs cannot prove why this sinking occurred or what Advanced Shoring did
that caused or contributed to its continued sinking. In fact, in response to Advanced
Shoring's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs did not even present evidence of what
work Advanced Shoring performed. (R. 44.) In fact, prior to filing the instant litigation,
Plaintiffs filed and subsequently settled a lawsuit against other parties which they claimed
were responsible for the sinking of the Property. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs were
certainly aware that the sinking could have been caused by someone or something
besides Advanced Shoring. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) In the face of such uncertainty on
causation, Plaintiffs were and are under the obligation to produce competent evidence
linking Advanced Shoring's conduct to the sinking of the home. In a case involving
complex questions about the soils underlying the home and other geotechnical factors,
such testimony could only be provided by an expert.
Plaintiffs contend that Advanced Shoring improperly placed helical piers and ram
or grouted piers under the Property, causing the Property to continue sinking and
therefore lose value. (R. 1.) This theory surely requires expert testimony. An average lay
person is not familiar with how helical piers work, the types of soil on which a helical
pier can be successfiilly placed, the factors that can cause a house to sink despite proper
placement of helical piers, or what factors could cause the Property to sink despite proper
installation of pier systems. Geotechnical engineering is at least as complex as repairing
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a tie rod on an ATV, which this Court held in Warenski required expert testimony to
prove breach and causation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs were required to produce expert
testimony on these issues here as well. Plaintiffs' failure to designate an expert is
therefore fatal to their claims, and the trial court should have granted Advanced Shoring's
pretrial motion for summary judgment.
c.
The trial court erred in denying Advanced Shoring's motion to
dismiss because Plaintiffs' failed to meet their burden to prove breach or
causation in their case in chief.
At the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, Advanced Shoring moved for a directed
verdict on Plaintiffs' claims on the basis that Plaintiffs' had failed to meet their burden to
prove breach or causation because Plaintiffs did not present expert testimony. (R. 79 at
pp. 114-116.) "Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for a directed verdict
submitted during a bench trial is treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal."
Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ^[13, 173 P.3d 865; Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 UT
App 167,^8-9, 982 P.2d 581.
As noted above, engineering issues of a technical nature are considered beyond the
scope of common knowledge and require expert testimony. See Warenski, 2011 UT App
197 at TJ11; cf. Preston & Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). Specifically, expert testimony is required to prove causation if the issues involved
"are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a
finding

" Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, ^|16, 12 P.3d 1015 (quoting

Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)); see also
Warenski v. Advanced RVSupply, 2011 UT App 197, ^11, — P.3d — .
20
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Plaintiffs did not designate any expert witnesses to give testimony at trial. This
court has previously held that "[a] party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under [rjules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence." Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, f 12, 141 P.3d 629.
Failure to comply with this rule bars the witness from giving expert opinions at trial. See
Ai at 1(14.
While Plaintiffs attempted to elicit expert testimony from several witnesses at trial,
for the most part such testimony was excluded. While the Court did allow Plaintiffs to
ask Per Danfors, president of Advanced Shoring for his expert opinion regarding
Advanced Shoring5s work on the Property, Mr. Danfors testified that Advanced Shoring
did its job properly. (R. 77 at pp. 118:2-16.) Mr. Danfors also testified that he did not
know why the Property continued to sink. (R. 77 at pp. 136:6-11.) He further testified
that the Property could continue to sink for reasons unconnected with anything Advanced
Shoring did or failed to do. (R. 77 at pp. 203:5-204:4.) Plaintiffs did not elicit (and the
Court did not admit into evidence) any expert testimony supporting their claim that
Advanced Shoring performed its work improperly or that an act or omission by
Advanced Shoring caused or contributed to Plaintiffs' damages.
Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove the elements of causation or breach by
expert testimony. Plaintiffs' claims should therefore have been dismissed. This court has
noted that "[a] plaintiff who otherwise deserves to lose is simply not entitled to a shot at
proving his case on cross-examination or at having the adverse party bumble into proving
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it for him." Grossen, 1999 UT App 167 at ^[9. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying
Advanced Shoring's motion, and the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ADVANCED SHORING'S
PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SUFFER ANY
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF ADVANCED SHORING'S
CONDUCT,

The proper measure of damages in a breach of contract action is the amount
necessary to "place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had
been performed." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^ 31, 990 P.2d 933 (quoting
Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994)).
Thus, where the party is in the same position it would have been in absent the breach, it
can recover no damages. See Id.; Missouri Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 555 F.2d 290,
296-97 (Ct. CI. 1977). This principle is in harmony with the basic purpose of contract
damages, which is to make the plaintiff whole; a measure of damages that punishes the
defendant or provides the plaintiff with a windfall is inappropriate. See TruGreen Cos.,
L.L.C. v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2008 UT 81, ^ 23, 199 P.3d 929 (quoting Am. Air Filter Co.
v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Although Utah courts have held that a property owner may recover damages for
construction defects even if he or she no longer owns the home at issue, the owner must
still demonstrate that he or she actually suffered damages. See Mitchell v. Stewart, 581
P.2d 564 (Utah 1978). In Mitchell, the plaintiffs discovered several defects in a home
they had purchased. Id. at 564. After selling the home for more than they had paid, they
filed suit against the builder based on the defects. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs
22
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were not barred from recovery simply because they no longer owned the home, noting
that "[i]f they suffered compensable damage, it would make no difference whether or not
they still owned the house." Id. at 564-65. This was true, the court reasoned, because the
house could have sold for even more if the defects had not been present. See Id.
Like the plaintiffs in Mitchell, Plaintiffs here are no longer the owners of the home
at issue. But that is where the similarities end. Unlike the parties in Mitchell, Plaintiffs
chose to abandon the mortgage on their home and allow it to fall into foreclosure. As
Plaintiffs' own documents show, this decision was based on factors unrelated to
Advanced Shoring's conduct. Thus, unlike the Mitchell plaintiffs, Plaintiffs in this case
cannot show that the value of the home differs in any way as a result of any act or
omission of Advanced Shoring. Plaintiffs made a conscious decision to cease making
their mortgage payments due to financial difficulties they suffered because of Mr. Hone's
health. In doing so, Plaintiffs independently reduced their interest in the residence to
zero. In other words, the value of the property to Plaintiffs now is the same as it would
have been absent any alleged breach of contract or warranty. Plaintiffs are in precisely
the same position they would have been in if there had been no breach. Therefore,
Plaintiffs' have no contract damages and cannot recover for any "lost value" in the
property.

Any loss they have suffered is due to their own actions, not Advanced

Shoring's. Cf. Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ^ 7, 89
P.3d 171 (no standing to sue where plaintiffs alleged injuries were "largely selfinflicted"). The trial court erred in denying Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for
summary judgment on this basis.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ADVANCED SHORING'S
PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
REVERSED
BECAUSE
THE
STATEMENT
"I WON'T
GUARANTEE IT UNLESS I GET $10,000.00 MORE", STANDING
ALONE, CANNOT CREATE AN ENFORCEABLE WARRANTY
CONTRACT
a.
Advanced Shoring's alleged statement to Plaintiffs is too indefinite
to give rise to an express warranty or indeed any enforceable contract as a
matter of law

Normal principles of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of an
express warranty. See Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 430, ^ 32, 124 P.3d
269. As Utah courts have consistently held, "An agreement cannot be enforced if its
terms are indefinite." Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 1 11, 78 P.3d 600 (quoting
Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996)). In other words, "if the
essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement
has been kept or broken, there is no contract." Id. at \ 12 (quoting Acad. Chicago
Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (111. 1991)); see also Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, \ 17, 94 P.3d 179.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a contract to purchase insurance
cannot be enforced unless "the scope of the risk, the subject matter to be covered, the
duration of the insurance, and other elements" can somehow be determined. Harris v.
Albrecht, 2004 UT 13, K 11, 86 P.3d 728 (quoting Hamacher v. Tumy, 352 P.2d 493, 497
(Or. I960)). Harris involved a business owner who had called his insurance agent and
asked him "to place business and fire coverage on [his] equipment and the contents [of
his office]." Id. at \ 5 (alterations in original). Although the agent stated that "he would
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take care of [it]" and "come out and look at [the] equipment," no insurance was ever
obtained. Id. (alterations in original). In affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the agent, the court stated that "negotiations will not ripen into a
contract until the parties arrive at an agreement as to all of the elements which are
essential to an insurance contract, including the subject matter to be covered, the risk
insured against, the amount of the indemnity, the duration of the coverage and the
premium." Id. at ^f 10. Since the agent had no information regarding any of these critical
issues, the court refused to imply even a contract to purchase insurance at a later date. Id.
atfl8.
Although the present case deals with an alleged express warranty rather than an
insurance contract, the principles stated in Harris apply here also. For purposes of
Advanced Shoring's motion for summary judgment, it was undisputed that an Advanced
Shoring employee told Plaintiff Lana Hone that "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000
more." (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.) "Express warranties presuppose that the parties have entered
into some kind of contractual agreement, and arise out of promises by the warrantor
guaranteeing or assuri ng a specific result. SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,
Stainback & Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 54, 28 P.3d 669.
Shoring's statement does not assure a specific result.

Conversely, Advanced

Neither does this statement

constitute "an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which
the other party may rely." Id. at «[fl8. In fact, it contains none of the defining terms of a
warranty—what is being warranted or promised, what the warranty covers, how long it
lasts, and so forth. The trial court's ruling essentially presupposes that Advanced Shoring
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was providing an unlimited and indefinite warranty that the Property would never sink
again, regardless of what the cause would be. Like the defective insurance contract in
Harris, Advanced Shoring5 s alleged warranty simply has too many holes to be
enforceable.
In response, Plaintiffs may argue that that Advanced Shoring's statement could be
interpreted to give rise to a contract to provide a warranty in the future. However, this
statement, and Plaintiffs' subsequent payment for additional materials, can at best
constitute a hopelessly indefinite agreement to agree. That is, such an argument leads to
the conclusion that perhaps Advanced Shoring and Plaintiffs agreed, because of
additional work would be performed and paid for, Advanced Shoring would still be able
to offer them a warranty in the future.

Although an agreement to agree is not

unenforceable per se, such an agreement must "containf] provisions otherwise capable of
enforcement . . . ." Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P. 2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). In other words, an agreement to agree, like any contract, "can be enforced by the
courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it
can be performed." Id. (quoting Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962)).
Olch involved a dispute over the enforceability of a preliminary lease agreement
that included general guidelines for determining the rent to be paid but omitted a critical
term that was to be inserted into the agreed-upon formula. Id. at 360. There, this Court
held that the agreement was unenforceable, noting that "an option to renew a lease is
unenforceable unless the rent to be paid, or some mechanism for determining the amount
of rent, is specified in the lease." Id. at 364. Accordingly, as the Court recognized,
26
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"where the conditions of the deferred contract are not set out in the provisional one, or
where material conditions are omitted, it is not a contract in praesenti because the minds
of the parties have not met and may never meet." Id. at 363 (quoting Chu v. Ronstadt,
498 P.2d 560, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)) (emphasis added). Notably, the court was not
swayed by the fact that the plaintiff, based on the preliminary lease agreement, had
"moved ahead feeling that [he] had an agreement for a lease for a location." Id. at 360.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement
of any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced."
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-429 (Utah 1961). In Valcarce, the parties had
engaged in substantial negotiations over the sale of some mink. Id. at 427. The buyer
received a certain number of the mink, and exchange gave the seller a check. Id. The
buyer later gave the seller a promissory note for a substantial sum. Id. The seller argued
that the promissory note was merely additional payment for the mink already transferred.
Id. The buyer argued that the promissory note was to pay for a side deal the parties had
discussed. Id. The terms of this side deal were not spelled out with any specificity. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[u]nder the circumstances shown to exist here,
where there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered
into in the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to
have made and enforce it." Id. at 428-429.
Under the rules stated in Harris, Olch and Valcarce, the Plaintiffs' breach of
warranty and breach of contract claims fail for the simple reason that Advanced
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Shoring's statement was too indefinite to be enforceable. Even assuming there was an
agreement to provide a warranty, Advanced Shoring's statement did not include critical
terms—the content and scope of the warranty. Nothing in Advanced Shoring's alleged
statement indicated which future events would be warranted against, which portions of
the work would be covered, what Advanced Shoring's work would be or do for the
Property, how long the warranty would last, or any other terms that would affect
Advanced Shoring's ability to plan for and carry out the warranty. Just as the Olch court
was unable to enforce the agreement absent a price term, the law does not allow the trial
court to simply create a warranty out of whole cloth. Rather, a "warranty" which does
not give any indication of what it consists of or what it covers is unenforceable as a
matter of law. Just as the subjective feelings of the plaintiff in Olch could not, standing
alone, give substance to a defective contract, in this case Plaintiffs' subjective belief
regarding the scope of this warranty is irrelevant. (R. )
Similarly, Nielsen v. Gold's Gym involved a commercial lease agreement that went
sour after the parties failed to agree on who should be responsible for necessary
improvements to the leased building. Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at \ 3. The initial contract
signed by the parties referred only to the lessor's responsibility to develop the
"premises"—a term that the lessor argued could not include post-construction
improvements that had not been contemplated at the time the agreement was signed. Id.
at K 9. The Utah Supreme Court, holding that no agreement had been reached as to the
improvements, noted that the lessor's argument "serve[d] only to reinforce the absence of
mutual assent as to the one issue that eventually terminated this relationship." Id. at ^ 10.
28
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As the court recognized, "The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the
parties1 intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually existed, there
can be no contract to enforce." Id. at ^f 12.
The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar result in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
v. Young, which involved an attorney hired by a law firm. Young, 2004 UT 26 at f 2. In
the course of joining the firm Young was told of the firm's practice of awarding bonus
compensation based on performance. Id. He was also told that attorneys with his level of
experience could usually expect to become partners within two to three years. Id.
Afterwards, when it became apparent that the attorney would be receiving a large fee on a
contingent case, he began negotiating with the firm as to how the fee would be divided.
Id. at f 5. In the course of those negotiations, both parties repeatedly promised "to be
'fair' with each other in attempting to determine the amount of 'fair and equitable'
compensation" that would be received. Id. However, after these negotiations broke down
due to his insistence on being made a partner and given an increased salary, the attorney
sued the firm for breach of contract. Id. at ff 6-7.
The court held that no contract had been entered into between the attorney and the
firm, since there had been no representation "that the firm would pay him a specific
amount of additional compensation in the future, or that [the attorney] was guaranteed to
become a shareholder. Furthermore, [the firm] never provided, nor did [the attorney] ask
for, clarification on what exactly constituted 'performance' sufficient to trigger increased
compensation." Id. at ^ 13. This was true despite the fact that the firm had indicated its
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intention to be "fair," since "no agreement was ever reached on the integral feature of the
alleged contract—[the attorney's] compensation." Id. at ^ 17.
The indefinite nature of Advanced Shoring's alleged statement is similarly fatal to
Plaintiffs' claims here. According to Lana Hone's testimony presented at summary
judgment, an Advanced Shoring employee told her, "I won't guarantee it unless I get
$10,000 more." Noticeably absent from that statement is any indication as to what is
being guaranteed—that the work will be completed, that it will be completed according
to the usual professional standards, that it will be free of defects, that it will fix the
problems with the home, or any other even remotely specific statement. The only expert
to testify in this matter indicated that such a warranty would be unreasonable. (R. 77 at
pp. 203:5-204:4.) Thus, like the alleged contract in Young, this purported warranty is
missing several essential terms, including most importantly, any fact or promise that is
being warranted. Accordingly, it simply was not possible for any reasonable person,
including Plaintiffs or the trial court, to tell what the alleged warranty was or whether it
was breached. This "warranty" is therefore unenforceable as a matter of law, and
summary judgment should have been granted.
b.
Advanced Shoring's alleged statement is, at best, a mere offer to
provide services which cannot, as a matter of law, be a warranty of a
specific result.
In order for an express warranty to be created, there must be "a 'direct and positive
affirmation of fact' made by the warrantor with regard to the quality or condition of the
goods or services provided, i.e., an affirmation of fact guaranteeing or assuring a specific
result." SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54,
30 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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f 21, 28 P.3d 669 (quoting Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 606 (Utah 1983))
(emphasis added). A mere agreement to provide services does not create a warranty,
since it is not a "guarantee^ that the services provided [will] be free from defects or
inaccuracies." Id. In other words, an express warranty (as the term "express" makes
obvious) cannot be implied merely from the fact that goods or services are being
delivered.
The Utah Supreme Court made this point clear in SME, which involved a contract
with an architectural firm to provide plans for a construction project. SME, 2001 UT 54
at T{2. After construction was begun, the structural steel fabricator for the project
encountered numerous difficulties and delays, which it claimed were due to faulty
designs by the architects. Id. at ^[4. The fabricator sued on the basis of several provisions
in the contract which the fabricator claimed constituted express warranties that the
architects' work would be free of defects; these included promises to act "in full
compliance with the latest applicable codes," to "set[] forth in detail the work to be
accomplished," to be responsible for "any necessary changes to . . . designs, drawings
and specifications" as well as "all of its professional negligent acts," and to do its work
"accurately and timely in accordance with industry standards." Id. at f 19.
The Court disagreed and held that these promises did not "set[] forth express
warranties guaranteeing that the services provided would be free from defects or
inaccuracies." Id. at | 2 1 . This was true, the court reasoned, because although the
provisions included promises to follow building codes and industry standards, they did
not "guarantee, assure, or warrant a specific result." Id. (emphasis added). As the court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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recognized, "[t]o hold otherwise would essentially turn every basic contractual promise,
duty, or obligation . . . into a warranty under which [the party] would be strictly liable,
despite the 'exercise of all reasonable or even all possible care.'" Id. (quoting Groen, 667
P.2d at 604); see also Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, % 13, 54 P.3d 1131 ("[T]o be
relied upon as a promise, a statement [constituting a warranty] must be highly specific or
definite.").
The distinction that was made in SME is likewise applicable to this case. Plaintiffs
allege that the statement made by Advanced Shoring constitutes a warranty that the
Plaintiffs' house will stop sinking. However, this statement is not a "direct affirmation of
fact. . . guaranteeing or assuring a specific result" as required under SME. Plaintiffs do
not allege that Advanced Shoring made a specific representation regarding the results of
its work. Even when looked at in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, this statement at
most indicates that additional funds were necessary in order for the work to be
completed. In other words, Advanced Shoring was merely agreeing to provide services,
not a warranty.
Furthermore, under the SME standard, a statement creating a warranty must be a
"direct and positive affirmation of fact . . . " SME, 2001 UT 54 at H 21 (quoting Groen,
667 P.2d at 606) (emphasis added). Here, Advanced Shoring's alleged statement is
insufficient as a matter of law to create a warranty, for the simple reason that it is not a
positive affirmation of a fact. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
Advanced Shoring stated that, unless additional funds were provided, a warranty would
not be given. A statement that, unless a condition is met, an event definitely will not
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happen in the future is not equivalent to a statement that an event will happen upon the
meeting of a condition. In other words, Advanced Shoring told Plaintiffs that they would
have to expend additional funds if they wanted to keep alive the possibility of receiving a
warranty at a later date. Plaintiffs' payment to Advanced Shoring was consideration for
the promise that this possibility would remain in place, not that it would become definite.
Accordingly, there is no enforceable express warranty, and summary judgment should
have been granted on that issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Advanced Shoring respectfully requests
the Court reverse the trial court's denial of summary judgment and remand this matter for
entry ofjudgment in favor of Appellant.
DATED this 12th day of September, 2011.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Gabriel K. White
Attorneys for Appellants
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1 I the contracts and given the Hones more than twice the value that
2

they originally bargained for.

Plaintiffs have not met their

3 I burden in this case, and we would ask the Court for a verdict of
4 I no cause of action and for an award of taxable costs.
5

THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

Ladies and gentlemen, I

6

address my comments to the courtroom in general as well as to the

7

parties because you have seen each attorney approach the bench,

8

and in time honored fashion begin their remarks with, "May it

9

please the Court.'' That particular phrase probably goes back

10

into the midst of time in Anglo-American jurisprudence, somewhere

11

way across the pond in jolly old England it was probably first

12

said.

13

I have to take the time and the comment at this point

14

to note that indeed Counsel, it does please the Court.

15

particularly on this day proud to be a lawyer, because ladies and

16

gentlemen, what you've seen here today is the use in a highly

17

civilized, highly intellectual, very careful and very precise

18

work by two well prepared, well trained and experienced lawyers

19

to bring an important matter before the Court -- important to

20

both sides —

21

resolution will be done under law.

22

I am

for a sensible and reasonable resolution, and this

Nobody is going to have to go to the streets.

Tanks

23

won't roll.

Nobody is going to have to go take the hunting rifle

24

off the wall.

25

that frankly, is the reason we all give thanks to a jurisdiction

It's done in a civilized reasonable fashion, and
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1

much above this Court's for living in this country in this day,

2

and why I have the particular joy of practicing before very

3

capable lawyers my profession.

4

What has come before the Court is the conclusion of a

5

very sad story.

Apart from the facts and the numbers and the

6

pictures and the cracks and the trips back and forth between Salt

7

Lake and La Verkin and all the depositions and the discovery and

8

all the problems that these people have undergone, there is a

9

heartache here that I have to be honest with everybody involved,

10

I cannot cure.

11

compensation or lack of award of compensation will make it any

12

better.

13

Only time will get you over this.

No award of

The law does not provide a particularly good solution

14

for these types of life changing experiences.

15

you -- and this is from personal experience, because I, too, have

16

been a litigant -- it will pass, and eventually it will be over,

17

and you'll go on enjoying your lives doing the things that you

18

like to do, and this will fade.

19

sooner rather than later.

20

All I can tell

I hope for everyone that that is

It's my responsibility as a trial judge after the

21

conclusion of a case like this to find certain facts and to make

22

conclusions of law and a judgment according to the application of

23

the law as it see it and the facts before me.

24
25

This case is about a contract and a warranty.

The key

issue to this case, as is in often many, many cases can easily be
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-911 I written on a sticky pad like the one I have in front of me, and
2

the question is was this work by Advanced Shoring warranted under

3

all the facts and circumstances in this case.

4

specifically finds that there was a written contract entered

5

into between Advanced Shoring and the Hones by their attorney,

6

Mr. Boyack, who was the signatory of that contract in behalf of

7

the Hones.

8

that responsibility in retaining Advanced Shoring.

9 I

Well, the Court

He was given that responsibility, and he fulfilled

As the contract progressed in its execution payments

10

were made, invoices were sent and then an event occurred which

11

is pivotal in the resolution of this case.

12

telephone call testified to by Mrs. Hone.

13

Court specifically finds that the advertisement brochure left on

14

the counter at the home was probably not sufficient to establish

15

a warranty.

16

least were something that Advanced Shoring discussed in their

17

course of business and maybe have some impact according to the

18

findings that the Court's going to make later on.

19

That event was that
Up until that time the

It was interesting in the fact that warranties at

The Court was stricken powerfully by what Mrs. Hone has

20

described as the fateful call.

I have been doing this —

I have

21

been in the trial courtrooms of the State of Utah for an

22

of 36 years now.

23

thousands of witnesses that I have listened to and examined

24

myself and cross examined myself of the clarity with which

25

Mrs. Hones testified.

excess

I was particularly struck after all the

I note that clarity in comparison to the
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1

failure to recall on the part of Mr. Garside.

2

absolutely crystal clear, "I cannot guarantee this project unless

3

I receive another $10,000."

4

Mrs. Hone was

I find specifically that in result of that statement,

5

Mrs. Hone contacted Mr. Boyack, her attorney.

It is the only

6

rational thing that anyone in Mrs. Hone's position would have

7

done.

8

regardless of which cape he was going around, Counsel, she did

9

make that contact through his office.

Her contacting Mr. Boyack makes perfectly good sense, and

Apparently it started out

10

by email, but it was not completed until Mr. Boyack came back to

11

the United States.

12

Therefore, the recitation by Mr. Garside that he did

13

not recall ever making a statement like that seems to be

14

substantially outweighed by the actions and the testimony of

15

Mrs. Hone and the subsequent actions of Mr. Boyack, and the

16

payment of the check for $8743.

17

that upon payment of that check that a warranty was bought.

18

There's no question in my mind that a warranty was purchased.

19

The Court specifically finds

That is further supported by the behavior of the parties

20

after that event.

21

Advanced Shoring was conducted beyond the work of November of

22

2006.

23

2007 and began the additional work.

24

that additional work.

25

Additional work that was not billed by

Advanced Shoring went back to the project in the summer of
No statements were sent for

It is clear to the Court that Advanced Shoring was
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1

operating under the assumption that there was a warranty, and

2

that the Hones, while they may have been unreasonable expectant

3

that there would be a warranty prior to the fateful call,

4

thereafter and following the payment of the additional

5

compensation above and beyond the signed contract that Mr. Boyack

6

had executed in their behalf, there was indeed a contract that

7

included a warranty.

8
9

Now the Court is going to pay some specific attention to
the very good arguments of Mr. White with respect to the statute

10

of frauds.

11

I've got two flat screens up here in front of me.

12

is the one that's connected to the courtroom.

13

computer flat screen.

14

brought up Title 25 of the Utah Code and the statute of frauds.

15

I brought up also all the appurtenant cases decided under Title

16

25 and the statute of frauds.

17

As Counsel know, and people in the courtroom know,
On this side

On this side is my

During the course of these proceedings I

I specifically find that this warranty probably is

18

outside the statute of frauds because it could have and should

19

have been accomplished within one year of the completion of the

20

work in November of 2006.

21

there is a reguirement of warranty to be completed within one

22

year could have and should have been concluded by November of

23

2007.

24
25

A non-statute of frauds warranty, if

In addition, I note that there is some case law that
would indicate the extension of a warranty like this must be by
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-94clear and convincing e v i d e n c e , not m e r e l y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of the
evidence.

My other findings are b a s e d upon a p r e p o n d e r a n c e

of

this -- of the e v i d e n c e , but as to this w a r r a n t y , a g a i n , I
reemphasize the e x p e r i e n c e of this trial j u d g e , m y e x p e r i e n c e
the trial courtrooms of this state, and the absolute c l a r i t y
overpowering weight of the t e s t i m o n y of M r s . Hone r e g a r d i n g
conversation.

in
and

this

I am clearly convinced as to the e x t e n s i o n of the

offer for-warranty and the acceptance t h e r e b y t h r o u g h the p a y m e n t
of the additional check.
than that.

It's not a full $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 .

It's

less

The subsequent b e h a v i o r of the p a r t i e s as I've

noted

is satisfactory to m e .
This is a case that is about contract and w a r r a n t y ,
as I've earlier indicated.
with n e g l i g e n c e .

It doesn't have anything to do

It doesn't have anything t o do w i t h

negligent

m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , but it is the w a r r a n t y a n d contract
The Court finds s p e c i f i c a l l y the contract was b r e a c h e d .

itself.
The

contract was b r e a c h e d b y the failure to p l a c e the b r a c k e t s

on

the 14 u n c o m p l e t e d p i e r s on the exterior of the h o m e .
There w a s evidence regarding the alleged source of t h e
d i r e c t i o n to leave the p r o j e c t .

The p e r s o n m a k i n g that

was never brought b e f o r e the C o u r t .

statement

That statement was h e a r s a y ,

was received by the Court not to p r o v e the t r u t h of the m a t t e r
asserted, but to e x p l a i n the b e h a v i o r of M r . D a n f o r s .
that testimony,

Without

from the w i t n e s s who w o u l d b r i n g that in in a

n o n - h e a r s a y fashion, that's not part of the record.
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1

excluded, and so basically the departure of the defendant from

2

the project is unexplained and must be laid squarely at the feet

3

of Advanced Shoring.

4

voluntarily left the project.

5

The Court can only find that they

That is underscored by the equally convincing testimony

6

of Mr. Hone about the events on the inspection in the entry way

7

of the home.

8

said, "Wow, I didn't realize it was this bad.

9

to call my insurance company.

Mr. Hone was very clear that Mr. Danfors basically
I'm going to have

I can't afford to do this."

The

10

departure from the project after that makes more sense, and is

11

the only evidence that the Court has before it on that issue.

12

Was the contract breached?

Well, it was breached

13

because the brackets were not installed and the work was stopped.

14

The contract also was breached because the apparent failure of

15

the bulbs on the interior piers or the absence entirely of the

16

bulbs on the interior piers, and I find that Mr. Stanforth's

17

testimony is compelling that when he drilled out the garage floor

18

around the pier that was placed in the garage next to the broken

19

pipe that there was no evidence of any grout material forming a

20

bulb there.

21

There was no picture evidence.

Mr. Stanforth's

22

testimony was absolutely clear that he removed the concrete

23

floor, he didn't remove any bulb.

24

there's other evidence in the photographs and the record before

25

the Court that the bulbs on the rest —

So that wasn't there, and

at least the eight that
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1

came up through the floor failed or were not there in the first

2

place.

3

that there was a breach in that circumstance.

4

We simply don't have any evidence other than the fact

I'm not sure that the Davencourt case applies to this

5

one.

6

in fact a new home sale to a buyer and not a repair contract.

7

the Court's simply falling back to prior law in the State of Utah

8

in order to establish what is appropriate in terms of damage.

9 J

I am persuaded by Mr. White's arguments that Davencourt is
So

Now some comment of the Court is necessary and some

10

findings of the Court are necessary to weigh upon the issue of

11

punitive damages, which have been prayed by the plaintiffs but

12

which the Court has indicated I'm not going to award.

13

damages are supported by the seven factors that Mr. Heideman so

14

ably demonstrated in his closing argument, a general overall

15

current of outrageous and totally unreasonable conduct before the

16

award of punitive damages.

17

Punitive

The Court is most impressed by the punitives damages

18

case that frankly is now the law in the United States because it

19

was a Utah case that the United States Supreme Court ruled upon

20

where a State Farm insurance company was found to be behaving in

21

an outrageous fashion in their behavior and failure to settle

22

litigation, and while the Utah Supreme Court initially and a Utah

23

jury initially assessed punitive damages of $144 million against

24

that company, the US Supreme Court cut it back substantially to

25

no more than 10 times the actual damage award, and the Utah
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Supreme Court came back and said, "Okay, only 10 times, but

2

here's the limit.

3

final judgment of the Utah Supreme Court was to go to that limit.

We're taking it right up the limit."

The

4

When I compare the behavior of State Farm Insurance in

5

that case and the behavior of others who have received an award

6

of punitive damages brought against them with Mr. Danfors'

7

behavior, there is a world of difference between them.

8
9

As you have heard this Court's comments and as you don't.
probably know as clearly as I'm going to place it on the record

10

now, I find Mr. Danfors' circumstances in this situation

11

incredibly difficult.

12

facing.

13

water pipe, but even if he had been told, I'm not sure by then he

14

could have done anything about it, and that's just mere

15

speculation on my part because we don't have any evidence on it.

16

He had a terrible problem that he was

I'm not sure that he was ever told about the broken

Everything I've seen Mr. Danfors do in this project by

17

coming back down, by responding reasonably to the letters in

18

Exhibits 3 through 7, in that correspondence back and forth,

19

everything that I have seen him do, while it supports my finding

20

of the warranty, it's a man making a good faith effort to do what

21

he can until he ran right up into something that he couldn't do

22

anymore, and apparently didn't get any insurance help after it,

23

and had to abandon the project.

24

consequence for Mr. Danfors, but that does not rise to the level

25

of punitive damages, and I simply cannot find punitive damages

That will have an unfortunate
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here, even though they were so ably and artfully argued by
Counsel for the plaintiff.

I just don't find that behavior

(inaudible) preponderance of the evidence.
But I must calculate damages.
the value of the home in 2006 —

I have a hard figure of

December of 2006 before the

problems came back again of $320,000.

I also know from the

testimony of Mrs. Hone that the Hones had borrowed 160,000 of
that value when they bought the home.

They hadn't bought the

home that long in advance, only a couple of years before.

So

their actual equity in the property was $160,000.
Because we don't have the mortgage company here as a
party to the litigation, I'm going to have to reduce the value of
320 by the 160 —

cut that in half because that's the actual

worth of the home to the Hones.
MR. HEIDEMAN:

Counsel?

Your Honor, the only reason I'm standing

is because in the rebuttal or reply I was going to argue two
specific facts that I think the Court has testimony on just -and I'll just call it to the Court's attention.

There was

testimony that the payments on the mortgage were $1800 per month,
and that those mortgage payments were made every single month.
THE COURT:

I also had Mrs. Hone's testimony that she

put $120,000 into the house.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
THE COURT:

Correct.

What I don't have, Counsel, is sufficient

evidence in the record to tell me how much of that was principal,
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1

how mu ch of that was i n t e r e s t , what the t e r m of the m o r t g a g e w a s ,

2

any of the m a t h that I n e e d to do.

3

goi ig to have to leave it w h e r e it is .

4

MR.

5

THE COURT:

HEIDEMAN:

As a c o n s e q u e n c e , I'm just

Okay.

So $160,000.

Now to that I must add the

6

damage suffered by the Hones after the failure of the first

7

repair attempt.

8

and I go directly to 89-A in the exhibits.

9

entry on the second to the last page that is made on March the

Counsel, your spreadsheet is extremely useful,
Prior to 89-A the

10

30th of 2007, prior to that the Court finds that those damages

11

total up to that point are not recoverable.

12

The reason I say they are not recoverable is because of

13

the fact that there's nothing in the contract or the warranty

14

that would allow this Court to reasonably infer or find directly

15

that Advanced Shoring took upon themselves the obligation to put

16

the home back into the shape that it was in when they first came

17

on the property, absent the damage.

18

cannot be had up to November of 2006.

19

So the 43,178.28 total

On the contrary, however, after that the line item

20

expenses shown on the spreadsheet after November are recoverable.

21

Counsel, I haven't done the math up here on the bench.

22

do that.

23

highlight this one; it's the Court's record, but I've made enough

24

reference to it.

25

You can highlight your exhibit.

You can

I'm not going to

Then I have the other problem because the Hones fixed
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1

the inside of this house twice.

2

inside of the house twice, Mrs. Hone has indicated that she had

3

the lost shoe box that showed those records, and in her best

4

estimation -- and again, she's a very persuasive witness —

5

had between 40 and $50,000 of additional expenses.

6

persuasive to the Court.

7

In order to put it back to the

she

That's

When I look at the care and attention that she placed in

8

the preparation of Exhibit 8 9-A, I'm firmly convinced that the

9

second attempt at repairing the home came up to 43,178.28.

So

10

Counsel, what you have is $160,000 plus 43,178.28 plus the total

11

of the spreadsheet beginning line item entry second to the last

12

page, 3/30/2007.

13

Now prejudgment interest applies at the rate of 10

14

percent per annum.

15

percent per annum, and the Court's very comfortable with this

16

date, September 1st, 2007 to date of judgment.

17

costs, 10 percent plus costs -- taxable costs under the law.

18

questions?

19

Counsel, prejudgment interest applies 10

MR. HEIDEMAN:

So total those
Any

The only other question, your Honor, is

20

with regard -- we had made an argument that while they were out

21

of the home that they should be entitled to recover the rentals

22

that they had, that they were paying the mortgage and rent at the

23

same time.

The testimony was

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. HEIDEMAN:

—

Have that in

—

The testimony was that it was $1300 a
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1

month, and the testimony from Mrs. Hone was that it was from

2

December of —

3

'05 through December of

4
5

I wrote this down, just one moment.

THE COURT:

x

December of

06, which --

That one I can't give her for, Counsel,

because that was prior to the contract.

6

MR. HEIDEMAN:

7

THE COURT:

I understand.

All right.

Thank you.

Nobody will walk out of here

8

happy, but the Court's done the best that I can.

9

your good work, Counsel.

10

MR. HEIDEMAN:

11 I

(Trial concluded)

The Court's adjourned.

Thank you, your Honor.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.)
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH B Y

MICHAEL and LANA HONE,

.!?

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 080501595

ADVANCED SHORING &
UNDERPINNING, INC., et al.,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendant Advanced Shoring & Underpinning Inc.'s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on April 13, 2010.
Having considered the motion, the memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, the Court denies
the motion.
Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
As the Court finds that certain areas of material fact, particularly those relating to the alleged
"warranty," remain in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture.
The motion is therefore DENIED.
DATED this / [

day of May, 2010.

JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
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1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

How long did it take you to move the stuff out of the

3
4

garage that was wet?
A.

Well, I remember we moved a lot of it out on the carport

5

and into one other area of the garage, and they were sweeping the

6

water out, and it would --

7
8

Q.

Now when you say we, who was helping you move the stuff

out?

9

A.

The workers of Advanced

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

I can't remember if he did or not.

12

lat er.

It was after work, because I made --

13

Q.

He was at work?

14

A.

I made a phone call to him, and I was not happy.

Did Mike help you move stuff out?

15

MR. HEIDEMAN:

16

THE COURT:

17

19

THE COURT:

Plaintiffs having

rested,

M r . White?
MR. WHITE:

Your Honor, we would

for a directed verdict.

23

arise in contract.

25

Your Honor, the plaint iffs rest.

All right.

22

24

Thank you, M s . Hone.

You may step down .
MR. HEIDEMAN:

21

I think -- he came

No further questions, your Honor.

Anything, M r . White?

18

20

Shoring.

like to make a motion

If I may, your Honor, plaintiff's

claims

That requires that plainti ffs prove the

I existence of contractual obligations, breach o f that
obi igation, that that breach causes damages.
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-115Now plaintiffs have failed to prove specifically two -well, really three of these allegations.

First, they failed to

prove the existence of a contractual obligation that is breached,
okay.

The testimony we've had so far has been that Advanced

Shoring promised to install certain piers on the property,
promised to put certain labor and materials into the property,
and the testimony has been that they did that, that they in fact
installed these piers.

However, perhaps the most glaring

deficiency in plaintiff's case is the lack of any expert
testimony whatsoever as to the appropriateness of the work
performed by Advanced Shoring on the property.
Advanced Shoring was engaged in geotechnical analysis
and piering and underpinning work, which is extremely technical,
and is very complicated.

I believe plaintiff's Counsel

recognized this when they asked Per, the only witness with any
technical training or expertise, as to whether or not even if all
the piers had been installed correctly, if the house could still
continue to sink.

Mr. Danfors said that it could.

So plaintiffs

lack fundamentally the required evidence to meet the threshold to
bear their burden of proof as to breach of the contract.
Even if we accept that there is some implied promise in
this list of work that was going to be done on the property, that
this together would cause the house to stop sinking, which I
don't know that we can do that.

But even if we did, we can't

prove that Advanced Shoring actually breached the contract
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1

because we can't prove that Advanced Shoring -- they can't prove

2

that Advanced Shoring actually did something improperly that

3

caused damages.

4

In fact, all of the evidence thus far has been that

5

Advanced Shoring installed the piers, that Advanced Shoring put

6

everything in place as per the contract, and that the house

7

continues to sink, and so far that's it.

8

burden of proof, plaintiffs have to prove breach and causation.

9

They have to prove that in fact Advanced Shoring did something

10
11

In order to meet their

that breached the contractual obligations.
So we've been through the text of the contract and we

12

don't see anything there.

13

an implied contractual obligation.

14

very clearly has only recognized in a warranty of workmanlike

15

construction otherwise known as a warranty of habitability as

16

recently as -- I believe it was last fall in the Davencourt case.

So we have to prove that they breached
Now the Utah Supreme Court

17

In that case the Court went through and specifically

18

disclaimed recognizing some of the generalized duties, like a

19

duty to comply with building codes, a duty to, you know, perform

20

construction in a non-negligent manner, and instead settled on

21

duty of an implied covenant of a duty of habitability.

22

this duty doesn't apply either in this case because we're not

23

dealing with new residential construction.

24

dealing with a repair. The Supreme Court was very clear that the

25

warranty does not apply to repair situations.

However,

In fact, we're
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We can't really

say, you know, that there is any implied warranties that are
recognized in the law that apply here.

We can't say exactly

where Advanced Shoring breached the contract because they
installed the piers.

I mean they did everything that they said

they were going to do, and the only witness who's been allowed
to testify who has any expertise in this area has said that
everything was done properly.

Plaintiffs also elicited similar

testimony from Mr. Bemis that he did everything that he
understood with his -- you know, his limited training that he
was supposed to do.
So plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove
causation with expert testimony in a case that very clearly
involves analysis of soils, the insertion of large pieces of
equipment deep into the earth, analysis of the bearing capacity
of materials and metals, soils and engineering of piering
systems.

Plaintiffs have to meet their burden in order to

require defendants to put on our case.
Now there is -- there hasn't been shown the existence of
a contractual obligation that would apply or breach or causation,
but furthermore, we have a big problem with regard to damages
because plaintiffs admit that they no longer own the house that's
at issue.

So we're talking about property damage to a house that

is owned by somebody else at this point.
So we believe that as a matter of law based on the
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1

evidence that's been educed thus far, the Court can't find --

2

cannot find that plaintiffs have any damages in the loss of value

3

or a typical property damage type claims because the plaintiffs

4

lost the house.

5

Now in response plaintiffs have indicated that they --

6

that the bankruptcy was caused by Advanced Shoring, but there's

7

simply no -- that they lost the house as a result of conduct by

8

Advanced Shoring, but there's simply no evidence of that, other

9

than plaintiff's blanket statement that's that what caused it.

10

In fact, Advanced Shoring did their work.

You know,

11

the testimony as to whether or not Advanced Shoring was asked

12

to leave or asked to finish their work is conflicting, but

13

regardless, even if we accept plaintiff's version of events that

14

they were told by Alan Boyack that Advanced Shoring wanted to

15

continue to do their work and plaintiffs testified -- Mr. Hone

16

testified that he knew that in order for that work to be done

17

inside the house they would have to vacate, for them to tell

18

Mr. Boyack that they were unwilling to vacate is tantamount to

19

saying you can't do this work, because it's impossible to do it

20

(inaudible) vacating.

21

So Advanced Shoring leaves the property.

Is ordered

22

off, leaves, either way we look at it.

23

years pass, two-and-a-half years pass and plaintiffs decide --

24

they don't take any -- they don't make any estimate for what it

25

would cost to repair the property.

Then a year passes, two

They don't hire anyone else
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1

to repair the property.

2

look at it to see what could be done.

3

decision at about the same time that M r . Hone -- or Mr. Hone

4

suffered an injury -- suffered a medical problem that allowed him

5

to -- that caused him to stop working.

6

stop making the mortgage payments and to let the house go into

7

foreclosure.

8

own testimony, in order to avoid a deficiency

9

They don't have anybody come out and
Then the make a conscious

They made a decision

to

Then they filed the bankruptcy, according to their
judgment.

This -- there's no causal link between what

happens

10

years after my clients leave the property and what happens -- and

11

what happened back when the shoring was performed.

So there's

12

insufficient evidence to show that Advanced Shoring

caused

13

plaintiff's

14

bankruptcy.

When we take plaintiff's bankruptcy into account,

15

plaintiffs have no loss of value damages, and they haven't met

16

their burden to show loss value damages.

17

indicated in a previous hearing that perhaps another theory

18

be recision.

19

because recision requires that the parties be capable of being

20

put back in the status quo.

21

given to Advanced Shoring, and Advanced Shoring put it right back

22

into the house.

23

somewhere.

24

house.

25

parties back to the status q u o .

Unfortunately

Now your Honor
would

that theory also is unavailable

At this point plaintiff's money was

That money is not sitting in an account

It was used to buy labor and materials to work on the

Now that the house is gone it's impossible to put the
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So we would move the Court for a directed verdict at

1
2

this stage because plaintiffs have not met their burden required

3

by their causes of action as stated in their complaint, and we

4

would ask the Court to find no cause of action.

5

THE COURT:

Counsel, the practice of the appellate

6

courts to require appellate Counsel to marshal evidence has

7

received much criticism from the bar, especially those who have

8

to do the marshaling, but concept find somewhat useful,

9

especially on a motion for a directed verdict, because there's

10

an area of the evidence that I'd like you to address that

11

Mr. Stanton just testified to.

12

The contract, as I understand it -- and this is

13

basically from Mr. Danfors' testimony, was that the piers that

14

would be installed in the interior of the home -- the ones that

15

are not affixed by brackets to the footings of the house on the

16

outside, that those would support the slab to which they were

17

adhering through the core, they would support the slab with a

18

bulb on top.

19

Mr. Stanton has just testified that when he excavated

20

with a jackhammer the garage floor that all he saw was the

21

column.

22

want to address that evidence that I have before me now, as it

23

implies your lack of the essential issue in any contract case,

24

and that's breach.

25

Some people would say that that's breach.

MR. WHITE:

How do you

Well, I agree, your Honor, let's address
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First of a l l , M r . Stanton -- and I don't want to rehash

too much old ground, but is one of the witnesses that was
identified more than a year after the close of fact discovery,
and so this is the first we've heard of his testimony

today.

However, Mr. Stanton testified that he went into this hole with a
jackhammer.

It's very likely -- very possible -- in fact, I

imagine likely, and we'll hear some testimony later today if your
Honor decides not to grant the motion that he in fact removed
bulb by jackhammering down through the

the

soil.

However, we won't ever know for sure because no
photographs were taken, no record was made other than his
testimony.

We weren't notified that inspection was going to be

made and that we weren't given an opportunity to inspect
evidence, and thus that evidence has been completely

that

spoliated.

THE COURT:

Let's look at the other

—

MR. W H I T E :

However

THE COURT:

-- situation, and that's Exhibit N o . 84 and

—

the testimony of M r s . Hone about the piers -- I'll just use the
non-technical term -- popping through the floor on the

interior

of the home.
Mr. Bemis has opined that it's possible that the
grouting could have left a void underneath the slab so that as
the rest of the house settled the grout in the coring could

have

been pushed up as the slab -- or would appear to be pushed up.
Actually, the slab is moving down and leaving the core in
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1

place -- the pier in place.

2

from a void formed as that particular pier was grouted.

3

But he's opined that it might be

It is logically difficult for the Court to make that

4

stretch that you could get the grout to fill the slab -- the

5

coring in the slab but not because it's liquid -- it's not water.

6

It certainly isn't chocolate pudding, but it might flow a little

7

bit more like chocolate pudding, but I don't know.

8

MR. WHITE:

That's my understanding.

9

THE COURT:

Well --

10

MR. WHITE:

It's roughly, but --

11

THE COURT:

My father-in-law always said yo u had to make

12

it like soft butter, but that's what grout does.

13

would follow with it is that it's very difficult to imagine that

14

you could to p off that core in the slab without having a bulb

15

formed direc tly unde rneath the slab.

16

My logic that

At this juncture on your motion for a directed verdict,

17

don't I have to draw inferences in favor of the plai ntiff's

18

position?

19

MR. WHITE:

I believe that your Honor does have to.

20

However, with regard to this particular issue, your Honor has

21

just said a couple o f things that I think are important to focus

22

on.

23

it wouldn't fill up the void.

24
25

First o f all, your Honor said it's difficult to imagine that

Add itionall y, your Honor -- I mean what we' re talking
about is on breach, it has to be a material breach, okay.
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If there are a few of these where they had slight puddling on
the inside, even if we accept that, which it sounded to me like
talk -- like listening to Mr. Bemis and on redirect that in fact
he's just speculating, because he also said it's possible that
these piers come up through the floor.

The important thing to

remember is that Mr. Bemis is not an engineer.

He's not been

qualified to provide expert testimony in this case, and he has
not been qualified by his experience to determine what causes
piers to come up through the floor.

He's qualified to install

piers.
THE COURT:

Not to worry about why they fail.

MR. WHITE:

Not to worry about why they fail, not to

analyze the bearing capacity, not to do that.

He's -- all Earl's

testimony was, "Hey, this is how I install the pier.

This is

what I did."
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. WHITE:

Okay.

Now the plaintiff's fundamental

problem here is this lack of expert testimony on the issue of
breach and causation.
underneath this house.

Plaintiffs cannot prove what's going on
They can't prove -- they can't tell the

Court why the house is still settling with that required expert
testimony.

They can't meet that threshold, and that is the crux

of the problem.
Even if we don't draw every inference in favor of
plaintiffs based on the evidence that's been presented thus far,
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there is no expert testimony proving that my client breached.
There's no witness that said to a reasonable degree of
engineering certainty or to a reasonable degree of geotechnical
certainty this -- I could say that this work was performed
deficiently and that but for this deficient performance, damages
would not have been caused.

So we just don't have -- plaintiffs

don't have the expert testimony that they in fact need.
They can't -- I mean they have no idea why the property
is sinking.

Mrs. Hone testified that she still to this day has

no idea why that property sunk.

That is a question that has to

be answered before a verdict could be entered by plaintiffs.

It

has to be this is why the property sunk.
There are two options.

This is why the property sunk,

or had you done everything correctly, the property wouldn't sink,
therefore it is -- and it is sinking; therefore, you didn't do
everything correctly.

Those are the two possible syllogisms that

plaintiffs have to prove, and they need expert testimony to
provide them, because when they asked Mr. Danfors, he said,
"Well, yeah," and it makes empirical sense because all these
piers are doing is going down and securing to hard layers of
earth and rock.

There are things underneath the hard layers of

earth and rock, and there are things that change.
Plaintiffs themselves have provided testimony that the
house at some times one part was sinking, at some times another
part was sinking, and just no idea why.

Without that expert
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1

testimony I think we're entitled to a directed verdict.

2 I

THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel, for your careful

3

analysis.

4

Or Mr. Larsen, whoever wants to jump up.

5 I

Mr. Heideman, let me give you a chance to respond.

MR. HEIDEMAN:

Well, even though I realize that most

6

people like him better -- he's better looking -- I'll take the

7

opportunity.

8

directed verdict to be granted, this Court would have to find

9

that a prima fascie case has not been made, and frankly, we can

10

Your Honor, the response is really simple.

For a

do -- I can refute that with just one witness.

11

At the point in time that Derek Imlay indicates that

12

there's a violation of law, according to the controlling case

13

law in the State of Utah, that is per se a prima fascie case

14

sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict, at a bare

15 I minimum.
16

THE COURT:

Counsel, none of the contractual parties

17 I ever mentioned as a term of the contract that a building permit
18

would be obtained.

19

MR. HEIDEMAN:

20

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

That was not a part of the contract.

Now I

21

can see that the contract without a building permit, according to

22

Mr. Imlay -- and he certainly wouldn't use the Latin -- but it

23

would be malum in se, but as to breach, you're fairly certain and

24

you can rest on breach simply because there was not a permit?

25

MR. HEIDEMAN:

I could -- for purposes of directed
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1

verdict, I certainly can, but of course the Court needs to

2

recognize that we have pled this case in multiple causes of

3

action -- contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and frankly,

4

based on the evidence, I think it almost becomes a res ipsa

5

issue.

6

regard to our closing argument to the Court.

7

That's one of the things we're going to focus on with

We're going to evaluate the law and identify how the

8

evidence fits that, and particularly under Rule 14 -- or 15, I

9

think the Court has a very simple method of bringing that claim

10
11

in based on the other claims that are already there.
That having been said, again, we have a prima fascie

12

case based on that alone, whether you apply it to the negligence

13

cause of action or the contract cause of action.

14

contract for an illegal thing.

15

element of the contract that says we will get a building permit,

16

just as I cannot contract to commit murder because it is illegal,

17

it is implied within the contract that the contract will be

18

performed in a workmanlike and more specifically a legal manner,

19

which requires the duties and obligations associated with a

20

general contractor to be complied with.

21

You cannot

Although you do not have an

Furthermore, your Honor -- and this is where I think the

22

analysis really comes down.

23

fascie case for multiple reasons, but the one that I'll focus on

24

at this time so that I don't give my entire closing argument is

25

that of duty.

The Yaz case makes this case a prima
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1 j

Yaz and Moore v. Smith, and frankly -- although it's

2

not a controlling opinion because it's not an appellate opinion,

3

but the decision rendered by Judge Ludlow in the case of Moser v.

4

Cottam, which follows that, and then the Davencourt opinion that

5

follows that is an appellate opinion, all of those cases identify

6

one very specific thing, that the requisite levels of knowledge

7

held by the parties is what this Court analyzes in determining

8

the duties that are outlined, and where there is a disparate

9

level of knowledge, where there is a large distance in the

10

contractual abilities to understand what's going on in the

11

process, the Court protects the parties by inferring -- actually,

12

by requiring that there be a duty and obligation met by the

13

contractor.

14

It's -- frankly, it's not that much different from a

15

malpractice action from a doctor or a lawyer.

When you have that

16

level of particular specialized knowledge, you are in fact deemed

17 1 to have that obligation to appropriately disclose what is
18 I relevant and to do your work in an appropriate manner.
19

Because the duty exists, because it was not performed,

20

and because there was a violation of law, again, I need -- I

21

don't need to spend a lot of time, although I certainly can,

22

going through each and every element.

23

simply cannot at this point in time -- particularly where this

24

Court is required to grant all reasonable inferences in favor of

25

the non-moving party, it just simply can't be granted.

The directed verdict
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1

I would point out one thing, though, that I think the

2

Court will want to take a look at before we get to closing

3

arguments, so I'll give the Court a case cite.

The case is

4

Price-Orem vs. Rollins, and it's 784 P.2d 475.

It's a 1989 Utah

5

Court of Appeals opinion, and it is going to be enormously

6

important in this case, which is why I bring it up at this stage.

7
8

Counsel's argument regarding the bankruptcy means less
than nothing.

That bankruptcy in and of itself is not going to

9 I be something that this Court even can consider, and the reason
10

for that is because anything that happens after the point in

11 I time that damage occurs with regard to damage calculations is
12

irrelevant.

13

subsequent actions just like subsequent remedial measures just

14

simply don't cut it.

15

The damage is what it is at the time of injury, and

That case is very, very clear, and that's why I give the

16

Court that citation, because I hope the Court will review it

17

before we get to closing arguments; I'll be discussing it in

18

detail.

19

THE COURT:

Did you bring a copy, Counsel?

20

MR. HEIDEMAN:

Your Honor, we actually pulled a copy and

21

we were trying to grab it, and we didn't, but we will have one

22

for you after lunch.

23

THE COURT:

If you could find me one, that would be

24

useful because I sometimes have to multitask up here, and keeping

25

it up on the screen means that I can't do other things, so a
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1

paper copy would help.

2

MR. HEIDEMAN:

3

a copy after lunch, your Honor.

4

that I think -- or conversation that needs to be had is this.

5

Not only do we survive a motion for directed verdict on every one

6

of our theories, but more specifically I notice that the argument

I will absolutely make sure that you have
The other comment or element

7 I is not made with regard to warranty.
8

Your Honor, we have a conflicting element of evidence.

9 I We have a party whom I think the Court is going to agree with me
10

is incredibly succinct and specific and will find to be a very

11

persuasive and credible witness in Mrs. Hone, who with grave

12

detail identified the fateful phone call wherein the warranty --

13 I if it didn't exist to begin with -- was certainly confirmed.
14

there an offer?

15

check proves it.

16

She testifies yes.

Was there acceptance?

The

That was what it was for.

Now we have conflicting testimony on the other side, but

17 I that's conflicting testimony.

The fact that it's conflicting in

18

and of itself kills the directed verdict.

19

have to weigh that evidence and make a determination.

20

Was

This Court is going to

As a result, if the warranty is found to exist, and the

21

fact that there was no repair effected, the only thing that could

22

possibly help the Counsel or the defendant at this point in time

23

again is a conflicting evidence statement, and that is whether or

24

not the Hones somehow precluded the performance of the warranty.

25

It's going to be very, very difficult for that -- for the Court
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1

to be able to find that such preclusion ever existed in light of

2

the fact that there is absolutely no direct testimony offered

3

whatsoever from anyone saying they spoke to Mrs. Hone or Mr. Hone

4

telling them that you couldn't come back to this property.

5

It would seem to me that if Counsel is going to indicate

6

that expert testimony is necessary to make some of these

7

conclusions, that it would be readily identifiable that if in

8

fact the secretary is the person who received this supposed

9

instruction, that she would be the one testifying, but she's not

10

here.

11

would be inadmissible hearsay.

12

Any testimony that might be given as to what she said

So all we have is Per Danfors' comment that, "No, I

13

heard it from my secretary."

14

said.

15

know this.

16

indicated to this Court that no such instruction was ever issued.

17

He can't tell us exactly what she

He can't tell us exactly what he heard, but we certainly
The Hones with again specificity and directness have

Frankly, but for the way the rule reads, I would move

18

the Court for a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff,

19

because no evidence exists or can exist that would go to the

20

contrary of that element in and of itself, and hence the Court

21

will be bound to find that a warranty at a bare minimum exists.

22

Then it really is only all about damages, which of course is what

23

our closing arguments are for.

24
25

That of course not being a procedural option, and I
certainly understand why, it's not something that this Court is
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likely to grant.

2

directed verdict.

3

answer them, but I have no desire to answer questions that the

4

Court's not asking.

5

THE COURT:

6

However, it certainly survives a motion for
If the Court has questions, I would love to

Counsel, walk through your res ipsa

analysis --

7

MR. HEIDEMAN:

8

THE COURT:

Sure.

-- because there is no testimony before the

9 I Court establishing a reasonable standard of care to support your
10

negligence claim other than what might be inferred from if it's

11

going to hold it up it ought to have something to connect it to

12 I hold it up, i.e., a bulb.
13
14

Walk through it how we get a res ipsa

argument without testimony on the standard of care.
MR. HEIDEMAN:

Your Honor, I'm happy to do that.

I hope

15

the Court will understand that I will fully develop this with the

16

case law to support it as part of my closing, but I mention it

17

here because I want the Court to be aware of it, and I want

18

Counsel to make sure he understands.

19

One of the key elements of res ipsa -- and I'll go

20

through each one of them in turn.

One of the key elements is

21

that the issue -- the problem be in the sole control of the

22

defendant.

23

about that.

24

of the major repairs, and during the repairs that they did live

In this particular instance there is no argument
My clients didn't even live at the house during much

25 I at the house, they didn't do anything.

They certainly didn't
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I honest to good ness can tell t h a t

1

have any technical exp ertise.

2

this Court would believe me i f I said that Lana Hone has never

3

operated an air ram.

4

the ground, and she is not li kely to do so •

5

She has never screwe d a helica 1 pier into

I also believe that the Court recognizes that
part icularl y given the medica 1 conditions that were suffered by
Mich ael Hone, he also did not , and there's not even been an
alle gation as to such.

9
10

repairs associated with the property are solely and specifically
within the control of ASU.

11
12

As a result, it's obvious that the

The testimony of Mr. -- Earl -- and I'm forgetting.
It's not Mr. Earl, it's --

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. HEIDEMAN:

Bemis.
Thank you, Mr. Bemis.

The testimony of

15

Mr. Bemis is incredibly persuasive in this regard, because what I

16

asked Mr. Bemis is, "All the jobs you've ever done --

17

them -- have you ever seen a pier come back up through the

18

floor?"

19

and dug down through the cement, did you see a bulb?"

20

fact, it app Bared as though it had been washed clear around that

21

area."

22

the piers fu actional can only be in the control of ASU.

23

thing speaks for itself in that regard.

24
25

"No f I haven't."

Mr. Stanton comes out.

all of

"When you went
"No.

In

Well , the installation of those bulbs as required to make
The

The Court asked a question, and I would offer this very
simple explanation.

I don't have any problem whatsoever
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1

believing that it would be very simple to create a gap because

2

anytime you fill up a hole rapidly with a slurry type material,

3

if it happens to go in fast enough, it will actually create an

4

air bubble.

5

your pole to make sure that you get all of the air out of it so

That's why when you pour cement you stick it with

there's not pockets of air formed therein.
It's quite probable in light of what we've heard that
just didn't -- simply didn't happen if -- and this is the other

9

real specific statement, if there was even a shallow area dug out

10

to fill the bulb with.

11

ASU.

12

Again, specifically within the control of

Because it's within the control of ASU, because it

13

failed, and because ASU's own testimony is they've never seen

14

that happen, and the guy that's in charge of doing this is the

15

guy that poured the slabs, and because he acknowledges that it

16

looks to be that there was a -- there's a failure.

17

pier, that's a failure.

18

there was a breach in the duty because the standard of care,

19

i.e., that the pier never ever comes up through the floor if it's

20

done right, was breached.

21

If that's a

In and of itself, that indicates that

Furthermore, when you have Mr. Stanton's very direct

22

testimony that there's no bulb here, and the standard of care has

23

been established that the bulb is required to bear the weight,

24

that's a breach.

25

to establish this, and particularly as I go through a very

I think it's quite clear that res ipsa is going

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-134-

1

detailed analysis, vis-a-vis Utah case law during closing

2

argument.

3

The other thing I wish to point out, your Honor, before

4

I sit down, and I think that this goes to the warranty issue, and

5

I almost forgot it, but just to make sure that we clear these

6

hurdles directly, is the testimony of Mr. Garside.

7

just said something very, very interesting to me.

8
9

Mr. Garside

I asked Mr. Garside -- and I was -- I went through this
multiple times to make sure that there was no misunderstanding

10

whatsoever.

11

free?"

"No."

12

bill?"

"Yes."

13

work, did they send a bill?"

14

the evidence is quite clear that a ton of work was done -- 40 to

15

50 to $60,000 worth of work as done, and more work was

16

anticipated, the likes of which Ms. Hone indicates are basically

17

the equivalent of starting over.

18

Mr. Danfors on the stand at around $150,000 for which roughly

19

58 had been paid.

20

I said, "Did ASU in your experience ever do work for
"If they went out and did work, did they send a
"If there was a warranty situation where they did
"No."

In this particular instance

We projected that with

I asked Mr. Garside, "Is that -- would that be

21

consistent with a warranty situation," and his answer was yes.

22

Now your Honor, this Court made a comment that I have enjoyed

23

many times repeating to other associates, but I will quote it

24

back to the Court.

25

that statement.

I can make some remarkable inferences from

In this particular instance, I hope the Court

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-135-

1

2

c a n as w e l l .

The testimony it has received, in particular from Lana

3

Hone, in particular from Dave Christensen, in particular from

4

Larry Stanton, in particular from the city official, Mr. Imlay,

5

this is not a hard case, and I look forward to closing.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

Moving party,

Mr. White, so you get the last say.
MR. WHITE:

9

Yes, your Honor.

I hope to be brief.

The

first problem that plaintiffs will have for the res ipsa claim is

10

that they don't have a negligence claim.

11

misrepresentation claim.

12

information or any alleged misrepresentations that my clients

13

made which were negligently made, so they don't have a straight

14

negligence claim, and so they can't make a res ipsa argument,

15

first of all.

16

They have a negligent

However, they fail to identify any

Second of all, res ipsa only applies where the

17

instrumentalities that cause the loss are within the exclusive

18

control of the defendant.

19

THE COURT:

Now I don't want to put words in your mouth,

20

Counsel, but what you're telling me is Advanced Shoring had no

21

control over what the material was underneath this house, what

22

the fill was, what was put there, what the subsurface below even

23

the fill may have been.

24

single core drilling, apparently, that AGEC gave them.

25

MR. WHITE:

The only thing they had was whatever the

Well, there's not even direct evidence that
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1

that's how many cores there were on the report.

2

there were, I mean opposing Counsel -- so this is one of the

3

major reasons why res ipsa doesn't apply.

4

cases, we see flower pots falling off a window ledge.

I mean we see res ipsa

5

THE COURT:

6

floor of the operating room.

7

MR. WHITE:

Yeah, exactly.

8

THE COURT:

That's my favorite one.

9
10

But even if

Well, Counsel, you find patients on the

People on gurneys

don't fall on the floor unless somebody messed up.
MR. WHITE:

Exactly.

Exactly.

It's within the sole

11

control of the hospital, and the people -- the doctors and the

12

nurses that are there.

13

factors, nothing else that could have happened.

14

case there are literally miles and miles and miles and miles and

15

miles of earth underneath this house that could be affecting why

16

it's sinking, and Advanced Shoring has control over none of that.

17

Now opposing Counsel also made an interesting point when

There's nobody else.

There's no other
Okay.

In this

18

he referenced the Yaz case and said that in construction it's

19

almost beginning like being a doctor or a lawyer, which is

20

particularly interesting because if we are dealing with a case of

21

breach of contract or breach of duty with a doctor or a lawyer,

22

the law is very clear that we must have expert testimony to prove

23

breach, which we don't have here.

24
25

We do not have -- plaintiffs don't have expert testimony
that says that Advanced Shoring should have done X and they
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1

didn't.

2

house would never sink, and the house is sinking; therefore,

3

Advanced Shoring did something wrong.

4

involving a doctor or a lawyer, there would be no question, okay,

5

because expert testimony is required to prove that standard of

6

care .

7

Why?

Or that if everything was done properly, the

I mean if this were a case

Now we're using the term standard of care somewhat
loosely here because again, this is a breach of contract case, a
breach of a warranty case.

However, even though standard of care

10

perhaps isn't the proper term, plaintiffs still have to prove

11

that we did something wrong which caused the house to sink which

12

caused plaintiff's damages, and they can't do that in this case

13

without an expert, and they have none, and they've disclaimed

14

having one.

15

that Advanced Shoring has done.

16

They haven't been able to point to anything glaring

We've got a pier that popped up, looks like almost like

17

a quarter of an inch out of the floor.

18

got little tiny minor things that we have no idea what they mean.

19

Maybe the popping up of the pier is because there's no bulb.

20

Maybe the bulb sheared off.

21

there he -- you know, there was no bulb on that particular pier.

22

Maybe he knocked it off.

23

no bulb on that was missed, but even is that a material breach

24

out of 60 some-odd piers, is it reasonable to suppose that one

25

pier that they have evidence -- they have any evidence, albeit

We've got -- I mean we've

Maybe when Mr. Stanton drilled in

Maybe there was one pier that there was
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1

disputed, that there was no bulb on this pier, that it's one pier

2

out of 60 or 70.

3

Mr. Danfors' testified that yeah, if you've got one pier

4

or even a few piers that are trying to hold up this whole house,

5

and they're the only ones that are staying where they're supposed

6

to, they're going to fail.

7

don't -- because they're not designed to hold the entire house.

8

So we always -- at the end of the day we all come back

9

It's going to shear off because you

to the fact that they have no expert testimony, and they need it,

10

because this is a very complicated case.

11

not mean strict liability.

12

Breach of warranty does

Now Counsel mentioned the breach of a building code as

13

being the basis for avoiding a dismissal by directed verdict.

14

However, there still has to be some connection between the breach

15

and the damages.

16

term that they get a building permit, although I guess it's

17

possible the parties could have understood that the Hones would

18

get the building permit, because it's just not in the contract,

19

so there's just no evidence.

20

Even if we can imply that it was an implied

Even if we did that, we would still -- plaintiffs

21

would still have to present some form of expert testimony that

22

the act of having the building permit would have prevented the

23

plaintiff's damages, and there just isn't any.

24

expert who can say, "Gosh, if you had had this building permit,

25

somehow that would have prevented the house from sinking, that

I mean there's no
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1

would have prevented their damages."

2

There simply just is no -- plaintiffs can't meet their

3

burden as far as whether or not damages -- Counsel's argument

4

that what happens after the fact can't affect what the damages

5

are, I struggle with that because we have so many doctrines in

6

the law where something that happens after again a negligent act,

7

which is not at issue here, is affected -- affects because --

8

especially in contract law because the object of contract law is

9

to put the parties back to where they were when they started.

10
11

THE COURT:

Consequential damages, the 38th domino in the

line, is still recoverable.

12

MR. WHITE:

Well, theoretically out to some limit, but

13

yes.

14

doctrines that affect damages.

15

There's interest statutes.

16

particularly at issue in this case of mitigation, which again

17

happens after the fact.

18

it was sinking before Advanced Shoring got there, it was sinking

19

after Advanced Shoring left, and then the Hones don't have the

20

house anymore for reasons that are unconnected with Advanced

21

Shoring completely.

22

I mean your Honor, we've got -- you've got all sorts of
You've got consequential damages.

There's a requirement which is

The reality is, the Hones had a house,

So where are their damages?

They're in exactly the same

23

position they were before the contract was made.

24

they don't have a house.

25

position they were before the house -- before the contract was

They didn't --

There's no way to put them back in the
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formed.

2

our motion for directed verdict.

3

So your Honor, again, we would ask that your Honor grant

THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

Gentlemen, I appreciate

4

very much your careful and professional advocacy.

5

lawyers in here have really understood everything that's

6

on, but it was well done and I appreciate that very much.

7

However, my job is to rule.

8

overruled and denied, and we'll hear the defendant's case, come

9

back into session at

10

Only the
going

The motion for directed verdict is

1:45.

Counsel, something has come up that I want you to

11

consider planning on.

12

order and stalking injunction calendar tomorrow morning.

13

Tomorrow afternoon is free.

14

now, but those almost never go.

15

be free for Monday afternoon.

16

matter.

17

case, Mr. White?

18

I'm going to have to take a protective

Monday morning I have prelims
Even if they did, I would

set
still

Let's look at the housekeeping

How long do you think you're going to be on your defense

MR. W H I T E :

We have a substantial amount to get from

19

these witnesses.

20

the Court, this is my first trial of this size, and so estimating

21

how long we're going to take is --

22

You know, if I could be completely honest

THE COURT:

How many witnesses do you think you're

24

MR. W H I T E :

Three.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

with

going

to have?

Each of those witnesses may be two
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20110256
MICHAEL HONE vs. ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN
CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
JAMES L SHUMATE
PARTIES
Plaintiff- MICHAEL HONE
Represented by: JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Represented by: TRAVIS LARSEN
Plaintiff-LANA HONE
Represented by: JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Represented by: TRAVIS LARSEN
Defendant - ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN
Represented by: GABRIEL K WHITE
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
391.75
Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
BAIL/CASH BONDS
Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

Posted:
0.00
0.00
300.00

PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted:
Forfeited:
0.00
Exonerated:
0.00
Balance: 310,000.00

391.75

300.00

310,000.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT lOK-MORE
Amount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
3.00
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage

Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

3.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
0.75
Amount Paid:
0.75
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
Amount Due:
8.00
Amount Paid:
8.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
225.00
Amount Paid:
225.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals
Posted By: CONNIE LOVERIDGE
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00 .
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety
Posted By: AMERICAN SAFETY INSURANCE SER (#ASB-523243)
Posted: 310,000.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Exonerated:
0.00
Balance: 310,000.00
CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
06-13-08 Case filed
06-13-08 Filed: Complaint
06-17-08 Judge JAMES L SHUMATE assigned.
06-17-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
06-17-08 COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
155.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
06-23-08 Filed return: Summons and Return of Service
Party Served: ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNED
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage

Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 19, 2008
08-25-08 Filed: Default Certificate
09-09-08 Filed: Answer
ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN
10-28-08 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Judgment
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
10-28-08 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
10-28-08 Filed: Affidavit of Scott T. Evans
11-12-08 Filed: Memorandum in Oppoisition to Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Default and Request for Hearing
11-12-08 Filed: Affidavit of Benjamin D Gordon
11-19-08 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside
Default
11-19-08 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
12-09-08 Filed order: Court's Ruling (Motion to set aside default, set
1/2 hr hearing)
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed December 09, 2008
12-10-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 11777735
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled.
Date: 03/17/2009
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Courtroom TBD
Fifth District Court
220 North 200 East
St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default
12-10-08 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on March 17, 2009 at 01:30 PM in
Courtroom TBD with Judge SHUMATE.
03-17-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO SET ASIDE
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: diannem
PRESENT
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE
LANA HONE
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): BENJAMIN D GORDON
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Video
Tape Number: FTR-D Tape Count: 2:17/2:25

HEARING
Arguments are heard.
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Court grants Motion to Set Aside the Judgment but that Judgment
may enter regarding attorney fees. Order to be submitted.
Counsel stipulates to the Court that they will submit a scheduling
order.
04-03-09 Filed order: Case Management Order
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed April 03, 2009
04-10-09 Filed: Certificate of Service Re Defendant Advanced Shoring &
Underpinning Inc's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures
04-20-09 Filed: Notice of Depositions of Per Danfors and Earl Bemis
04-27-09 Filed: Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Initial
Disclosures
06-08-09 Filed: Noticew of Firm Name Change
07-06-09 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Alan Boyack
12-02-09 Filed: Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
12-02-09 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
12-02-09 Filed: Defendants' Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Over
Length Memorandum
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
12-07-09 Filed order: Order Granting Defendants' Ex Parte Motion for
Leave to File Overlength Memorandum
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed December 07, 2009
12-31-09 Filed: Fax to Judge Shumate from Lisa Ross (Copies to counsel
and file per JLS 1/4/10)
01-08-10 Filed order: Order Granting Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed January 08, 2010
01-15-10 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
02-10-10 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
02-10-10 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Re Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
02-22-10 Filed order: Court's Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment: Set
1 hour hearing. Courtesy copies 1 week before trial.
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed February 22, 2010
03-01-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 12796452
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is scheduled.
Date: 04/13/2010
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
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Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
03-01-10 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on April 13, 2010 at
01:30 PM in Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
04-13-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION FOR SUMMARY JDMT
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: janaj
PRESENT
Plaintiffs): LANA HONE
MICHAEL HONE
Plaintiffs Attomey(s): BENJAMIN D GORDON
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Video
Tape Number: FYT/3D Tape Count: 1:43-2:31

HEARING
TAPE: FYT/3D Mr. White addresses the court stating his reasons for
summary judgment request.
COUNT: 2:07
Mr. Gordon addresses court stating Plaintiffs position.
COUNT: 2:21
Mr. White again addresses the court.
COUNT: 2:30
The court takes the matter under advisement. He will issue a
decision within 60 days.
05-11-10 Filed order: Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment
Judge JAMES L SJIUMATE
Signed May 11,2010
05-25-10 Filed: Certificate of Readiness for Trial and Request for
Pre-Trial Conference
06-25-10 Filed: Notice of Initial Pre-Trial Conference
07-01-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on July 27, 2010 at 09:30 AM in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
07-27-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: diannem
PRESENT
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): BENJAMIN D GORDON
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Video
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 1035/10:47

HEARING
Counsel informs the court that they are ready to proceed to trial.
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Discussions are held regarding exhibits, depositions, final orders
and discovery.
Case has not been mediated yet but may be attempted.
Deadlines are given.
this matter to be set for a 5 day bench trial in January, 2011.
Notice to be given.
07-28-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 13139913
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 12/15/2010
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 01/24/2011
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 01/25/2011
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 01/27/2011
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 01/28/2011
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle

Printed: 09/12/11 19:10:19

Page 6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage

St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 01/31/2011
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
07-28-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 15, 2010 at 10:00 AM
in Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 24, 2011 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 25, 2011 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 27, 2011 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 28, 2011 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 31, 2011 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
09-03-10 Filed: Motion for summary Judgment
09-03-10 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
09-17-10 Filed return: Certificate of Service re: Defendant's
Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures
Party Served: ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, LLC
Service Type: Mail
09-17-10 Filed: Defendant's Rule 26(a)(4) Pretrial Disclosures
09-24-10 Filed: Pretrial Disclosures
09-24-10 Note ******END OF VOL I ************
09-28-10 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
09-29-10 Filed: Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment
10-04-10 Filed: Motion to Exclude Evidence Produced After the Expiration
of Fact Discovery
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
10-04-10 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude Evidence
Produced After the Expiration of Fact Discovery
10-06-10 Filed: Supplemental pretrial disclosures
10-12-10 Filed: Certificate of Service Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures
10-25-10 Filed: Rule 37 Motion to Strike l]the Declaration of Michael
Hone; 2]the Amended Declaration of Lana Hone; 3]Portions of
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Pretrail Disclosures and 4]Portions of
Plaintiffs Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
10-25-10 Filed: Request to Submit Motion for Summary Judgment
10-25-10 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of
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Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Strike
11-02-10 Filed: Combined Memorandum in Opposition to Rule 37 Motion to
Strike and Motion to Exclude Evidence Produced After the
Expiration of Fact Discovery
11-12-10 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of
Rule 37 Motion to Strike: 1) The Declaration of Michael Hone;
2) The Amended Declaration of Lana Hone; 3) Portions of
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Pretrial Disclosures; and 4)
...Discovery
11-12-10 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Re: Advanced Shoring's
Rule 37 Motion to Strike: 1) The Declaration of Michael Hone;
2) The Amended Declaration of Lana Hone; 3) Portions of
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Disclosures; and 4) Portions
of...Disco very
11-17-10 Filed: Stipulated Joint Motion for Judicial Mediation
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
11-30-10 Note: PTC on 12-15-calendared incorrectly- should have been the
14th„, counsel called & stipulated to vacate 12-15-10 and have
PTC and additional motions heard on 12-14-10 at 2 pm
11-30-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE/MOTIONS rescheduled on December 14, 2010 at
02:00 PM Reason: Stipulation of counsel.
12-01-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Modified.
Reason: Stipulation of counsel
12-01-10 PRETRIAL CONF/PENDIN MOTS scheduled on December 14, 2010 at
02:00 PM in Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
12-14-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL CONF/PENDING MOTION
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: trudyg
PRESENT
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
TRAVIS LARSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Audio
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 2:09-3:15

HEARING
This matter comes before the Court re: Motion in Limine, Motion
to Strike, and Motion for Summary Judgment.
COUNT: 2:12
Opening briefs are made. The Court overrules and denies the
Motion in Limine and Motion to Strike without prejudice.
COUNT: 2:19
Arguments are made; and Motion for Summary Judgment is over-ruled
and denied.
COUNT: 3:09
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Court recommends resolving this matter; counsel have stipulated to
Mediation and state that they have submitted a Stipulation to
Submit to Judicial Stipulation.
Mediation Judge's Scheduling Clerk to schedule Mediation Hearing
for 1/2 day, and send notice before trial on 1/24/10. Counsel to
prepare and submit Mediation Brief to Mediating Judge.
12-21-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 13470000
MEDIATION is scheduled.
Date: 01/07/2011
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 2A
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George UT, UT 84770
Before Judge: ERIC A LUDLOW
Judge Ludlow will conduct mediation in this matter. The 5 day
bench trial is scheduled to begin 1-24-11 with Judge Shumate
12-21-10 MEDIATION scheduled on January 07, 2011 at 09:00 AM in
Courtroom 2A with Judge LUDLOW.
12-21-10 Filed: Notice of Mediation
01-07-11 Note: **Medation: Off record. Settlement/ agreement not
reached.
01-13-11 Filed: Certificate of Service of Subpoenas
01-19-11 Filed: Trial Brief
01-21-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Boyack subpoena)
01-24-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 1)
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: michellh
PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): MICHAEL HONE
LANA HONE
Defendant(s): PIER DANSFORS
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): TRAVIS LARSEN
JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 9:03/5:00

HEARING
COUNT: 9:03
Opening Statements are made. Exclusionary rule is requested and
ordered.
COUNT: 9:19
Eric Michael Campbell is sworn and testifies. Plaintiffs exhibit
266 is submitted.
COUNT: 10:01
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Plaintiffs exhibit 266 is recieved.
COUNT: 10:02
Witness is excused.
COUNT: 10:03
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 10:12
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel.
Piers Dansfors is sworn as a hostile witness for the plaintiffs and
testifies.
COUNT: 10:35
Plaintiffs exhibit 263 is offered.
COUNT: 10:36
Plaintiffs exhibit 263 received.
COUNT: 10:39
Exhibit 264 offered.
COUNT: 10:46
Plaintiffs Exhibit 264 is received. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is
offered.
COUNT: 10:53
Plaintiffs exhibit 1 is received. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 is
offered.
COUNT: 11:03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 and 7 are offered.
COUNT: 11:12
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 11:24
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. Mr. Dansfors re-takes the stand and testimony continues.
COUNT: 11:55
Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 is submitted. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 and
Exhibit 3 is received.
COUNT: 12:00
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 is submitted.
COUNT: 12:01
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 is received.
COUNT: 12:06
Plaintiffs exhibit 5 is submitted.
COUNT: 12:18
Plaintiffs exhibit 5 received. Plaintiffs exhibit 6 is
submitted.
COUNT: 12:30
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 1:45
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. Mr. Danfors retakes the stand and continues testimony.
COUNT: 1:53
Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 is offered and received.
COUNT: 2:08
Plaintiffs Exhibit 262 is offered.
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COUNT: 2:09
Plaintiffs Exhibit 84 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 86 is offered.
COUNT: 2:26
Defense Exhibit 267 is offered.
COUNT: 2:29
Defendant's exhibit 267 is offered but entered.
COUNT: 2:32
Defendant's Exhibit 268 is offered.
COUNT: 2:55
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 3:07
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel
and Mr. Danfors testimony continues.
COUNT: 3:15
Defense Exhibit 269 is offered.
COUNT: 3:23
Defense Exhibit 269 is received.
COUNT: 3:46
Mr. Danfors is excused. Mr. Alan Boyack is sworn and testifies.
COUNT: 3:51
Defense Exhibit 268 is received.
COUNT: 4:51
Mr. Boyack leaves the stand.
COUNT: 4:59
Court is adjourned for the day.
01-24-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service
01-25-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 2)
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: michellh
PRESENT
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE
LANA HONE
Defendant(s): PERS DANFORS
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
TRAVIS LARSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 9:03/5:15

HEARING
2nd Day:
COUNT: 9:01
All parties are present with counsel. Lana Sue Hone is sworn and
testifies.
COUNT: 9:32
Exhibit 262 if offered.
COUNT: 9:58
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Exhibit 8 is offered. Court is in recess.
COUNT: 10:01
Exhibit 9 is offered. Court is in recess.
COUNT: 10:14
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with the
counsel.
COUNT: 10:15
Plaintiffs Exhibit 89A "Overview Spreadsheet of Receipts" and
Exhibits 89 through 260 "Receipts" are offered and accepted.
COUNT: 10:39
Plaintiffs exhibit 10 is offered
COUNT: 10:40
Plaintiffs exhibit #10 and Plaintiffs exhibit #9 are received.
Plaintiffs exhibit #15 is offered.
COUNT: 10:41
Plaintiffs exhibit # 15 is received. Plaintiffs exhibit 16 is
offered and received. Plaintiffs exhibit 17 is offered.
COUNT: 10:42
Plaintiffs exhibit 17 is received.
COUNT: 10:43
Plaintiffs exhibit #21 and 22 are offered and received.
Plaintiffs exhibit #23 and 18 are offered and received.
COUNT: 10:45
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23 and 18 are received.
COUNT: 10:47
Plaintiffs exhibit #29 and 24 are offered and received.
Plaintiffs exhibit #25 is offered and received.
COUNT: 10:50
Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 through 88 is received.
COUNT: 11:09
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 11:20
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. Mrs. Hone retakes the stand.
COUNT: 11:36
Plaintiffs Exhibit #261 is received.
COUNT: 11:44
Defense Exhibit 270 is offered. Court is in recess.
COUNT: 11:55
The court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. Mrs. Hone retakes the stand and continues testimony.
COUNT: 11:56
Defendant's Exhibit 270 is received.
COUNT: 12:30
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 1:50
The court is back on the record. Parties are present with
counsel. Mrs. Hone retakes the stand.
COUNT: 2:21
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Witness is excused. Michael J. HOne is sworn and testifies.
COUNT: 2:55
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 3:07
The court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. Mr. Hone retakes the stand and testifies.
COUNT: 3:55
Mr. Hone is excused.
COUNT: 3:56
The court is in recess.
COUNT: 4:25
The court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. David K. Christensen is sworn and testifes.
COUNT: 5:00
Objection to Mr. Christensen as witness remains on the table.
Court is adjourned until Thursday 1/27/11 at 9:00 a.m.
01-26-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 3)
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: michellh
PRESENT
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE
LANA HONE
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): TRAVIS LARSEN
JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Video
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 9:05/3:55

HEARING
COUNT: 9:06
Mr. David K. Christensen retakes the stand. Arguments are
presented regarding the motion on allowing expert testimony.
COUNT: 9:28
The court ruling stands on accepting Mr. Danfors testimony as a
non-expert witness.
COUNT: 9:29
The court rules that any questions to Mr. Christensen regarding
his experience will be stricken as expert testimony. Other
testimony given stands.
COUNT: 9:42
Mr. Christensen is excused.
COUNT: 9:43
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 10:05
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. Derek Inlay is sworn and testifies.
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COUNT: 10:24
Mr. Inlay is excused from the stand.
COUNT: 10:26
Mr. Earl Bemis is sworn and testifies.
COUNT: 11:07
Mr. Bemis is allowed to step-down.
COUNT: 11:08
Laryy Leroy Stanton is called, sworn and testifies.
COUNT: 11:24
Mr. Stanton is excused. Kevin Gurside is sworn and testifies.
COUNT: 11:40
Lana Hone is recallled.
COUNT: 11:43
The Plaintiffs rest.
COUNT: 11:44
Defense requests a directed verdict for no cause of action.
Arguments are presented.
COUNT: 12:23
Motion for direct verdict is denied by the court.
COUNT: 12:25
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 1:36
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel.
COUNT: 1:47
Mr. Gurside is recalled.
COUNT: 2:19
Mr. Gurside is excused.
COUNT: 2:45
Court is in recess.
COUNT: 2:54
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 271 is offered and received with no objection
from defense. Mr. Earl Bemis retakes the stand and testifies.
COUNT: 3:29
Mr. Bemis is excused. Defense rests. The court is in recess.
COUNT: 3:49
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel
Mrs. Hone is recalled to the stand.
COUNT: 3:54
Court is adjourned.
01-26-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Earl Bemis)
01-26-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Alan Boyack)
01-26-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Kevin Garside)
01 -27-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 4)
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: michellh
PRESENT
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Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE
LANA HONE
Defendant(s): ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNED
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
TRAVIS LARSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Video
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 2:08/5:16

HEARING
COUNT: 2:08
Closing Arguments begin.
COUNT: 3:56
The court is in recess.
COUNT: 3:51
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with
counsel. Closing Arguments continue.
COUNT: 4:16
The court finds the contract was executed in behalf of the Hones
by Mr. Boyack with Advanced Shoring & Underpinning.
The court finds the brochure from Advanced Shoring & Underpinning
is not sufficient to prove warranty.
However, with the sworn testimony of Mrs Hone regarding a phone
call from Advanced Shoring and Underpinning and the additional
payment made, the existance of a warrant is viable.
The court does not find negligence against the defendant.
The court finds the contract was breached by the defendant when
they voluntarily left the project. There is no proof or testimony
that the Hones ordered the defendant from the property.
The court does not award punitive damages.
The court awards any line items on Exhibit 89A after 11/16/2006
are recoverable. The court also grants an amount of $43, 178.28 to
the plaintiffs for receipts lost during the flooding of the home
and moving.
The court awards the difference between what the home sold on the
market at bankruptcy auction and the amount the home was valued in
the appraisal.
The court finds a 10% prejudgment interest applicable from 9/1/07
to the date of judgment. Mr. Heideman to prepare the paperwork.
COUNT: 5:14
Court is adjourned.
01-27-11 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Motion to Strike and Exclude
Undesignated or Improperly Designated Expert Testimony
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
01-27-11 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike and Exclude Undesignated or Improperly Designated Expert
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Testimony
01-28-11 Filed return: Subpoena and Certificate of Service (Alan Boyack)
Party Served: 0
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 14, 2011
01-28-11 Filed return: Subpoena and Certificate of Service (David
Christensen)
Party Served: 0
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 14, 2011
01-28-11 Filed return: Subpoena and Certificate of Service (Thomas Tadd)
Party Served: 0
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 14, 2011
02-09-11 Filed: Affidavit of Costs
02-15-11 **** PRIVATE **** Filed: Motion for Bill of Costs to be Taxed
by the Court
**** PRIVATE **** Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
02-15-11 **** PRIVATE **** Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Bill of Costs to be taxed by the Court.
02-16-11 Filed order: Judgment and Order
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed February 16,2011
02-16-11 Judgment #1 Entered $ 289065.54
Debtor: ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNED
Creditor: LANA HONE
Creditor: MICHAEL HONE
289,065.54 Total Judgment
289,065.54 Judgment Grand Total
02-16-11 Filed judgment: Judgment
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed February 16, 2011
02-16-11 Case Disposition is Judgment
Disposition Judge is JAMES L SHUMATE
02-16-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01 -24-2011
02-17-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
3.00
02-17-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
02-17-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
8.00
02-17-11 CERTIFIED COPIES
Payment Received:
3.00
Note: 20.00 cash tendered.
8.25 change given.
02-17-11 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
02-17-11 CERTIFICATION
Payment Received:
8.00
02-20-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01-25-2011
02-22-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01-27-2011
02-24-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01-28-2011
02-25-11 Filed: Notice of Appeal
02-25-11 Fee Account created
Total Due:
225.00
02-25-11 APPEAL
Payment Received:
225.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
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02-25-11 Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
02-25-11 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
02-25-11 Filed: Notice of Appeal
02-25-11 Filed: Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal and
to Set Bond
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
02-25-11 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal and to Set Bond
02-25-11 Filed: Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion and Order for
supplemental Proceeding
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
02-25-11 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
motion and Order for Supplemental Proceeding
02-28-11 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Bill of Costs to
be Taxed by the Court.
03-02-11 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal and to Set Bond
03-07-11 Filed: Transcipt of Bench Trial Eelctronically Recorded on
01/24/2011
03-07-11 Filed: Transcript Bench Trial Elctronically Recorded on January
25,2011 (Volume II)
03-07-11 Filed: Transcript of Bench Trial Electronically Recorded on
January 27, 2011 (Volume III)
03-07-11 Filed: Transcript - Bench Trial Electronically Recorded on
January 28, 2011 (Volume IV)
03-08-11 MOTION HEARING scheduled on March 15, 2011 at 04:00 PM in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
03-14-11 Filed: NOTICE OF HEARING ON PENDING MOTIONS
03-14-11 Filed: Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of 1) Advanced
Shoring's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal
and to Set Bond; 2) Advanced Shoring's Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Motion and Order for Supplemental Proceedings; and
3) Advance
03-15-11 Note: **Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal sent to Ut Court of
Appeals**
03-15-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING MOTION
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: michellh
PRESENT
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE
LANA HONE
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Video
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 4:02/4:05

HEARING
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Motion to require the defendant's to file a supersedas bond before
filing an appeal.
Arguments are presented.
Motion is overruled and denied.
Mr. Heideman to prepare the order.
03-18-11 Issued: Motion and Order for Supplemental Proceeding
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Hearing Date: April 25, 2011
Time: 08:30
03-25-11 Filed: Motion to Approve Bond Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 62
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K
03-25-11 Filed: Memorandum to Approve Bond Pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 62
03-28-11 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court of Utah
04-04-11 Filed: Objection to Sufficiency and Amount of Supersedeas Bond
and Memorandum in Opposition to motion to Approve Bond
(Expedited Rule 62 Hearing Requested)
04-04-11 BOND MOTION scheduled on April 11, 2011 at 04:30 PM: in
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE.
04-04-11 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 13691432
BOND MOTION is scheduled.
Date: 04/11/2011
Time: 04:30 p.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT 84770
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
04-04-11 Filed: Notice of Bond Motion Hearing
04-06-11 Filed: Certificate Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 11(e)(1)
04-08-11 Filed: MEMORANDUM REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
APPROVE BOND AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
OJBECTION TO AMOUNT AND SUFFICIENCY OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
04-11-11 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Apporve Bond
and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Objection to Amount
and Sufficiency of Supersedeas Bond
04-11-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BOND MOTION
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE
Clerk: michellh
PRESENT
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE
LANA HONE
Plaintiff s Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
TRAVIS LARSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Video
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 4:29/4:46
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HEARING
Matter before the court is the plaintiffs objection to the amount
of supercedias bond and the form.
Arguments are made.
COUNT: 4:45
Motion is overruled and denied. Order for stay is approved. Mr.
White to prepare the paperwork.
04-21-11 Filed: Supercedeas Bond
04-22-11 Filed: AMERICAN SAFETY INSURANCE SER 310000.00
04-22-11 Bond Account created
Total Due: 310000.00
04-22-11 Bond Posted
Non-Monetary Bond: 310,000.00
05-09-11 Filed order: ORder Approving Supersedeas Bond Pursuant to Rule
62 and Staying Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE
Signed May 04, 2011
05-09-11 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals Notice
06-08-11 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals
06-23-11 Note: Appealed: Case #20110256
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL HONE

Et al,
Plaintiff,

vs.
ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN,
Defendant.
Clerk:

MINUTES
PRETRIAL CONF/PENDING MOTIONS
Case No: 080501595 PD
Judge:
JAMES L SHUMATE
Date:
December 14, 2010

trudyg

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
TRAVIS LARSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE
Audio
Tape Number:
3D
Tape Count: 2:09-3:15

HEARING
This matter comes before the Court re: Motion in Limine, Motion
to Strike, and Motion for Summary Judgment.
COUNT: 2:12
Opening briefs are made. The Court overrules and denies the
Motion in Limine and Motion to Strike without prejudice.
COUNT: 2:19
Arguments are made; and Motion for Summary Judgment is over-ruled
and denied.
COUNT: 3:0 9
Court recommends resolving this matter; counsel have stipulated to
Mediation and state that they have submitted a Stipulation to
Submit to Judicial Stipulation.
Mediation Judge's Scheduling Clerk to schedule Mediation Hearing
for 1/2 day, and send notice before trial on 1/24/10. Counsel to
prepare and submit Mediation Brief to Mediating Judge.
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